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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR:
Justice Douglas on Liberty in the Welfare State
HANS A. LINDE*
VI. PUBLIC GRANTS, BENEFITS, AND SERVICES
Although the needs of the national economy and national security
have vastly expanded the public sector, it is the direct underwriting of
individual living standards and social services that characterizes the
welfare state. Inevitably, conflicts between the views and objectives
of the welfare state's political management and the views of some
claimants to welfare state benefits have put in issue the constitutional
limitations on the power to deny, withdraw, or condition such benefits.
And inevitably, the cry of "constitutional rights" in public programs
has been countered with the cry of "privilege." The arguments were
already familiar when Mr. Justice Douglas joined the Court. But
the growth of the welfare state since 1939 and the political pressures
to exclude the unworthy from its earthly paradise have given the
issue greater modern importance.
The doctrinal lines had been drawn in cases involving such classics
of socialism as the post office, highways, and land-grant colleges. Among
post-World War I cases sustaining the 1917 Espionage Act, when the
first amendment received its first judicial debate through the dissents of
Holmes and Brandeis, the Supreme Court in United States v. Burle-
son... had affirmed the power of the Postmaster General to deny second-
class mailing privileges to a Milwaukee paper because of its anti-war
and socialist articles and editorials. To objections based on freedom of
the press, the Court answered that the extremely low second-class rate
was "a frank extension of special favors to publishers" by Congress,
that it was open to appellant to "mend its ways, to publish a paper con-
forming to the law" rather than to carry on "this futile litigation, un-
dertaken upon the theory that a government competent to wage war
against its foreign enemies was powerless against its insidious foes at
home," and that any injury to the paper was "the result of its own
* Professor of Law, University of Oregon Law School.
The first installment of this article included five parts: I. The Turn to the Public
Sector; II. The Role of the Judge; III. Private Property and the Public Domain;
IV. States' Rights in the Public Sector; V. The right to Work. 39 WAsH. L. Rxv. 4
(1964).
164255 U.S. 407 (1921), citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), Froh-
werk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919), Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919),
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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choice."'1 5 Mr. Justice Brandeis protested that the government's postal
power, like all others, was subject to the Bill of Rights and that the
Court should not needlessly adopt a statutory construction raising
grave constitutional questions. 6' Mr. Justice Holmes, forsaking his
earlier dicta about the power to condition privileges, agreed: "The
United States may give up the post office when it sees fit, but while
it carries it on the use of the mails is almost as much a part of free
speech as the right to use our tongues.""' To the dissenters, the
Constitution placed on the government, not on the citizen, the burden
of abandoning one objective for another, of acting within prescribed
limits or not at all.
The "privilege" doctrine that let the United States Post Office deny
cheap postal service as a means of press censorship would not let Cali-
fornia claim that its ownership of highways was a basis for regulat-
ing motor carriers. The majority that had earlier told the Milwaukee
Leader to mend its editorial ways if it wanted to use the government's
mails now stated that, since the truck regulation would be unconstitu-
tional if attempted directly, it would be a "palpable incongruity.., to
uphold an act by which the same result is accomplished under the guise
of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the
state threatens otherwise to withhold."' 6 Holmes and Brandeis again
165 255 U.S. at 410, 416.
166 Id at 429-30. Besides citing the first, fifth, sixth and eighth amendments, Brandeis
thought that arbitrary denial to one of a privilege that could be withdrawn from all
would deny equal protection of the law, brought into the fifth amendment "due process"
clause from the fourteenth amendment. He would not read the statute defining "un-
mailable" matter, which the Postmaster General might exclude completely, to give him
discretion to refuse the second-class rate to a newspaper deemed mailable at higher
rates.
167 Id. at 437.
108 Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926). "It is not
necessary to challenge the proposition that ... the state, having power to deny a priv-
ilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose. But... one
of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment
of constitutional rights," continued Mr. Justice Sutherland. Later he limited his Frost
Trucking opinion to the exaction of conditions unrelated to protection of the highways.
Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932). Many early cases involved the power of
states to make otherwise unenforceable demands of foreign corporations as a condition
of admitting them to intrastate business, so that the issue became familiar in legal lit-
erature, see e.g., Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77 U. PA. L. REv. 879 (1920),
Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 CoLUm. L. Rxv. 321
(1935), Note, 73 HAxV. L. REv. 1595 (1960), French, Unconstitutional Conditions: An
Aalysis, 50 GEO. L.J. 234 (1961); but the extreme statement in Frost Trucking is
interesting here because California's defense rested on the claim of state power over its
public sector. More recently attention to "unconstitutional conditions" has focused on
restrictions attached to public services and facilities that are claimed to violate specific
guarantees of the Bill of Rights. An excellent study of much of the material in this
section is Willcox, Invasions of the First Amendment Through Conditioned Public
Spending, 41 Coa.mrL L. Q. 12 (1955).
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dissented, this time on the side of government.169 But in 1934 not one
member of the Court doubted California's power to condition admission
to its state university upon compulsory participation in the R.O.T.C.
without thereby invading fourteenth amendment rights of pacifist stu-
dents:
California has not drafted or called them to attend the university. They
are seeking education offered by the State and at the same time insisting
that they be excluded from the prescribed course solely upon grounds
of their religious beliefs and conscientious objections to war, preparation
for war and military education."'
Four years later, Missouri found that a state's power to place condi-
tions on admittance to its university did not extend to excluding a
Negro student who could claim the fourteenth amendment's "equal
protection" rather than its "liberty" of religious scruple.' Whatever
greater discretion the Constitution might leave the states in dispensing
public benefits than in making laws, after 1938 it did not include
explicit disqualification by race. Racial discrimination, however, is
only the easiest illustration of a constitutional limit on governmental
discretion in distributing public benefits and services. Disqualification
from benefits may collide with other claims of constitutional rights
beyond the equality of Americans of different racial or national origins.
As in the case of public employment," 2 these constitutional claims in-
clude the substantive freedoms of the first amendment and the guar-
antees of fair procedures, and they are no less controversial when
asserted by claimants to government largesse than to government jobs.
And, as in the case of public employment, so in the growing dependence
on the public sector created by the pervasive extension of public serv-
ices and benefits, Mr. Justice Douglas has seen that liberty in the
welfare state requires recognition of these constitutional claims.
In 1946 the Court had occasion to reexamine the issue of postal
censorship when the Postmaster General denied second-class mailing
privileges to Esquire magazine on the ground that some of its pictures
and stories, while not obscene, were not devoted to the dissemination
of public information, literature, science or the arts. Writing the
169 Mr. Justice McReynolds dissented separately. 271 U.S. at 602.
17 0 Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 262 (1934).
'7' Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). The received learning
about states' rights in the use of public tax funds, Cummings v. Richmond County Bd.
of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899), Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927), appealed only
to McReynolds and Butler, 305 U.S. at 353 (dissenting).
172 See Part V, 39 WASH. L. REv. 4, 31-46 (1964).
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opinion in Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc."" Mr. Justice Douglas began
with the frank premise that the second-class privilege was a form of
subsidy, worth $500,000 a year to Esquire. Nevertheless, he found
that Congress did not, in describing the categories to be so favored,
mean to assign the post office the function of judging the content of
publications. This action would be economically equivalent to censor-
ship. Since the Postmaster General was held to have misapplied the
statutory standard to Esquire magazine, no constitutional issue was
decided. But the opinion raised an explicit warning against reliance
on government discretion to withhold a subsidy at will. Fraudulent or
obscene material might be excluded from the mails, "but grave constitu-
tional questions are immediately raised once it is said that the use
of the mails is a privilege which may be extended or withheld on any
grounds whatever. See the dissents of Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr.
Justice Holmes in United States v. Burleson."'7 4
It is the dissents from the Burleson doctrine of government discre-
tion to withhold "special favors" that have survived as citations in
modern opinions. In 1954 Mr. Justice Douglas, ruling as Circuit
Justice on a motion for interim relief from official interception of mail
under obscenity laws, cited the dissents when he suggested that Post
Office power to intercept mail "touches basic freedoms" and might
amount to an unconstitutional prior restraint or infliction of punish-
ment." 5 When the Supreme Court sustained criminal convictions for
depositing obscene matter in the mails, Mr. Justice Harlan could assert
in a dissent that "the hoary dogma... that the use of the mails is a
privilege on which the Government may impose such conditions as
it chooses, has long since evaporated."' 78 And when the issue of post
office authority to exclude obscene materials upon its own admin-
istrative findings reached the Court, Douglas, with the Chief Justice,
joined Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion denying such a statutory mandate
to the Postmaster General; as in Hannegan, they saw in the suggestion
that Congress might authorize administrative censorship by anything
-
7 3 Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946). The stated findings referred to
one of the statutory standards for second-class mail, 39 U.S.C. § 226 (1958).
174 327 U.S. at 156. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, feared that the majority's
dicta threatened "the freedom of society from constitutional compulsion to subsidize
enterprise' and considered "the basis on which the Government may grant or withhold
subsidies through low postal rates" a very different question from postal censorship.
Id. at 160.
175 Stanard v. Olesen, 74 Sup. Ct. 768, 771 (1954).
178 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 504 n.5 (1957). Mr. Justice Douglas, joined
by Black, dissented from the majority's standard of obscenity, id. at 508.
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less than a "fully judicial" procedure the gravest constitutional
doubts. 7 Thus far, the expression of such doubts, and statutory
constructions to meet them, have sufficed to avoid deciding either the
substantive or the procedural constitutionality of postal discrimination
against mail potentially within first amendment protection, just as
these techniques have served in the employment area.1 7 ' But whatever
may be the fate of the Congressional practice to deny postal service to
disfavored mail, it will not escape constitutional scrutiny merely be-
cause a government service rather than government regulation of a
commercial service is involved.17 The government may carry mail at
a financial loss beyond the limits of what it may impose on a commercial
carrier, but nothing can be kept out of the United States mails that
Congress could not equally keep out of transmission, at least within
reach of the federal commerce clause, by American Express or Western
Union."s °
Constitutional issues could not be avoided when disqualification from
social security benefits-the very heart of the welfare state-came
before the Court in Flemming v. Nestor.' Congress had left no room
for statutory interpretation. Payments were to be withdrawn from any
person who was deported from the United States because of illegal
entry, conviction of a crime, or subversive activity.'82 Nestor, a Bulgar-
ian, had lived and worked in the United States continuously from 1913
until 1956. He was deported under the Internal Security Act of 1950
because he had been a member of the Communist party from 1933 to
1939, a period when this was neither unlawful nor an express ground
for deportation. Thereupon the government told Mrs. Nestor, who re-
mained in the United States, that her husband would receive no further
social security payments, and Nestor appealed the constitutionality of
177 Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 498-500, 519 (1962). Of the seven
justices participating, two voted to reverse the determinations of nonmailability on the
merits; they thought that the issue of post office authority had been insufficiently
raised and briefed for decision. Mr. Justice Black concurred in reversal without opin-
ion. Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting, was saved from any constitutional doubts by agree-
ing that they were not brought to the Court.
178 See 39 WASH. L. REV. 4, 38 n.138, 42-43, n.150-56.
179 A United States District Court has declared unconstitutional the detention of
unrequested "communist political propaganda," reimposed by Congress after having
been ended by President Kennedy, 76 Stat. 840, 39 U.S.C. § 4008, (Supp. V. 1964) ;
Heilberg v. Fixa, 236 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Cal. 1964); prob. juris. noted 379 U.S.
997 (1965). See also Schwartz, The Mail Must Go Through-Propaganda and
Pornography, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 805 (1964).
180 Compare Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. United States, 345 U.S. 146 (1953) ; Champion
v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
11363 U.S. 603 (1960).
182 42 U.S.C. § 402(n) (1959) ; see 363 U.S. 603 n.1 ; id. at 618 n.10; id. at 620 n.13.
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this determination. In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court sus-
tained the Congressional withdrawal of social security from the dis-
favored deportees against all attacks.
The constitutional objections were indignantly argued by the dis-
senters. Mr. Justice Black, a Senator when social security was enacted,
would hold the program a contributory insurance plan giving rise to
claims that could not be repudiated without compensation any more
than a matured insurance policy. Quoting the then chairman of the
Senate Finance Committee, he recalled that social security was pre-
sented, not as charity, relief, or a dole for retired workers, but as an
earned right; to hold that the government "is merely giving them some-
thing for nothing and can stop doing so when it pleases... reveals a
complete misunderstanding of the purpose Congress and the country
had in passing that law."" 3 Mr. Justice Douglas agreed. "Social Secu-
rity payments are not gratuities,' 8' he wrote, citing the use of a trust
fund and the relationship of benefits to the amount of tax previously
collected from the beneficiary. To him, the 1954 amendment was "a
classic example of a bill of attainder.., a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without a judicial trial."'8 ' He quoted Irving Brant: "To-
day's bill of attainder is broader than the classic form.... There is
mental in place of physical torture, and confiscation of tomorrow's
bread and butter instead of yesterday's land and gold."' 85 But the
Court had in the past recognized disqualification from professions and
from employment as "pains and penalties" equivalent to attainder.
Cutting off a person's livelihood by denying him accrued social benefits-
part of his property interests-is no less a punishment. Here, as in the
other cases cited, the penalty exacted has one of the classic purposes of
punishment--"to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others."... Social
Security benefits have rightly come to be regarded as basic financial
protection against the hazards of old age and disability... Could Con-
gress on deporting an alien for having been a Communist confiscate his
home, appropriate his savings accounts, and thus send him out of the
country penniless?... The difference, as I see it, between that case and
183 363 U.S. at 623. The insurance theory of social security, here relied on to claim
a constitutional right to accrued benefits, has led others to claim a constitutional right
to exemption from the program. The Old Order Amish of Pennsylvania, who have
religious scruples against insurance, have refused to pay social security taxes, leading
to some controversial episodes of enforced collection by the Internal Revenue Service
in 1961. See Liberty, March-April, 1964, p. 7.
184 Id. at 631.
1s5 Id. at 629, citing Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867) and Ex
parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
181 Brant, Bills of Attainder in 1787 and Today, address at Columbia Law Review
dinner (1954).
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this is one merely of degree. Social Security benefits, made up in part of
this alien's own earnings, are taken from him because he once was a
Communist. s'8
Together with the Chief Justice, Douglas also joined Justice Bren-
nan's dissenting argument that the 1954 disqualification, as applied to
one who left the Communist Party in 1939 and paid social security
taxes until 1955, was an ex post facto law.'88
The majority of five offered its refutation of these charges in a dis-
play of Mr. Justice Harlan's technical facility worthy of a better cause.
Though the social security system is one of "social insurance" reflect-
ing a legislative judgment that productive workers have a just claim
on the economy in their later years, he wrote, still the employee's non-
contractual stake in the system is neither analogous to an annuity nor
an "accrued property right." Congress from the beginning reserved
in the law itself the power to alter, amend, or repeal any provision in
it. The disqualification of beneficiaries deported for illegal entry, crime,
or Communism (though not of all deportees) did not necessarily show
the kind of punitive design needed to invoke the constitutional prohibi-
tion against attainder and ex post facto laws. Congress might have
thought that payments to individuals permanently residing abroad
would not serve the increase in consumer purchasing power that might
be one purpose of the social security program. For constitutional pur-
poses, "it is, of course, irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact under-
lay the legislative decision, as it is irrelevant that the section does not
extend to all to whom the postulated rationale might in logic apply....
In vain, Mr. Justice Brennan pointed out that the 1954 amendment
hinged the loss of social security not on the fact but on the grounds
of deportation, and that it was enacted in a national atmosphere no less
emotional and vindictive than that of the Reconstruction laws voided
in Cummings v. Missouri.9 and Ex parte Garland.' If a fictitious pur-
pose might have made a broader provision constitutional, the majority
would not hold the actual blow struck by Congress against a narrower
class to have none but punitive reason.'92
Nestor's plight was the more dramatic because Congress ended, first
his life in the United States, and then his retirement income in a strange
187 363 U.S. at 630-32.
188 Id. at 634.
189 Id. at 612.
190 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
19 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).192 363 U.S. at 609-21, 637-40.
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and distant country, for acts which had been long past and completed.
But the crucial constitutional problem of such congressional policies,
in legislating for federal benefits and services, lies beyond the injus-
tices of retroactivity. Suppose that a program required no contribution
from beneficiaries, that Congress explicitly reserved the power to
change the rules of eligibility, and that these were changed only with
respect to future conditions within the potential claimant's control.
Disqualification for any cause would not, then, fit the ban on, bills of
attainder and ex post facto laws, yet would it be beyond all constitu-
tional limitations? Significantly, even the majority in Nestor denied
this, though it found no "accrued property rights" in social security.
"This is not to say, however, that Congress may exercise its power to
modify the statutory scheme free of all constitutional restraint," wrote
Mr. Justice Harlan. "The interest of a covered employee under the
Act is of sufficient substance to fall within the protection from arbitrary
governmental action afforded by the Due Process Clause."' 3 At the
heart of the decision lies an inescapable judgment, couched in terms of
"classification," for or against the constitutional merits, not the timing,
of depriving Communists of social security. Harlan himself would not
evade this judgment with his speculations about a deportee's failure to
aid domestic consumption: "Nor, apart from this, can it be deemed
irrational for Congress to have concluded that the public purse should
not be utilized to contribute to the support of those deported on the
grounds specified in the statute."'94 Thus the promised constitutional
restraints were at once pushed to the outermost limits of "rationality"
by invoking a special power of the purse. Yet what in the Bill of Rights
would forbid legislation, for example, for the forfeiture of future com-
mercial annuity policies or private pension rights upon deportation for
Communism or crime, that does not equally apply to legislation for the
forfeiture of G.I. Insurance, or social security, or of any publicly-
financed benefit? Before the Nestor decision, Professor Harry Jones
had told an international colloquium on the Rule of Law that "the
reasonable expectations of a social service beneficiary are as meaning-
ful for the rule of law as the interests of an owner of investment
securities or real property."' 95 The actuarial value of Nestor's future
198 Id. at 611.
'04Id. at 612.
'95To support that conclusion, he had said: "I see no reason why the word 'right,'
with its nuique emotive power, should be deemed inappropriate for these new expecta-
tions and preempted for use only in connection with such traditional interests as those
in tangible property. For example, studies tell us that the typical middle income Amer-
1965]
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social security benefits, at the time of cancellation, was $6000; it was
not farfetched for Mr. Justice Douglas to compare their forfeiture to
the expropriation of a savings account. But among the dissenters, Mr.
Justice Black alone reached beyond the retroactive effects on Nestor
to meet the majority's broader constitutional judgment on first amend-
ment grounds.
Despite the majority's "see-no-evil" readiness, when facing a head-on
collision with Congress, to find rationality in depriving political de-
portees of social security, Nestor did not leave in doubt the principle
that constitutional rights limit the power of the purse as well as the
power to regulate. The Court has firmly declared that principle both
before and after Nestor, when mere states rather than Congress trans-
gressed those constitutional limits. And both procedural and substantive
constitutional guarantees have been applied to protect claims to gov-
ernment benefits. When California made property tax exemptions for
war veterans and for churches conditional on filing an oath disclaiming
advocacy of violent overthrow of the United States or California, the
Court, in Speiser v. Randall,'96 conceded that the state could con-
strue the denial of exemptions narrowly to reach only taxpayers
whose advocacy went beyond the bounds of the first amendment.'
Nevertheless, California's disclaimer requirement fell because it placed
on the taxpayer the burden of proof that he was not in the class denied
exemption. "When the State undertakes to restrain unlawful advocacy
it must provide procedures which are adequate to safeguard against
infringement of constitutionally protected rights," wrote Mr. Justice
Brennan, "and the validity of the restraint may turn on the safeguards
which they afford.' 8 In most cases, it is fair to place on the taxpayer
ican reaches retirement age with a whole bundle of interests and expectations: as
home-owner, as small investor, and as social security 'beneficiary.' Of these, his social
security retirement benefits are probably his most important resource. Should this, the
most significant of his rights, be entitled to a quality of protection inferior to that af-
forded his other interests? It becomes the task of the rule of law to surround this new
'right' to retirement benefits with protections against arbitrary government action, with
substantive and procedural safeguards that are as effective in context as the safeguards
enjoyed by traditional rights of property in the best tradition of the older law." Jones,
The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUm. L. REv. 143, 154-55 (1958).
196 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
197 Id. at 519, referring to Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) ; First Uni-
tarian Church v. Los Angeles, 357 U.S. 545 (1958). The Court held that, even though
the exemptions might not have been granted at all, once they were available they could
not be denied on the basis of the taxpayer's political expressions, citing Esquire and
the Burleson dissents, notes 166, 173, supra, and Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233 (1936), which had invalidated Huey Long's tax on the advertising receipts of
233 (1936), which had invalidated Huey Long's tax on the advertising receipts of
Louisiana's major anti-Long newspapers.
198 357 U.S. at 526.
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the burden to qualify for an exemption. But here exemption hinged
on whether certain speech could or could not constitutionally be cur-
tailed; if the taxpayer faced the task of convincing the authorities that
his speech was privileged, the pressure toward caution would tend to
inhibit lawful as well as unlawful expression. California's tax-exemption
procedure infringed first amendment liberty even if its substantive
standard did not. Only Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting, spoke of "the
State's bounty" and "[refusal] of the taxing sovereign's grace in order
to avoid subsidizing" revolutionary advocacy. 9'
Procedure was no issue when South Carolina applied a rule denying
unemployment compensation to claimants voluntarily unavailable for
work so as to disqualify a Seventh Day Adventist who would not work
on Saturday. In Sherbert v. Verner,00 the Court held this denial of
compensation to abridge the claimant's freedom of religion. "The rul-
ing forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion
and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand,"
the majority stated, once again through Mr. Justice Brennan. Nor
could the rule be saved "on the ground that unemployment compensa-
tion benefits are not appellant's 'right' but merely a 'privilege.' It is
too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression
may be infringed by the denial or placing of conditions upon a benefit
or privilege.""' The inclusion of "expression" with religion seems nat-
ural enough, since both liberties are guaranteed by the same first
amendment; yet this apparently artless dictum swept under the protec-
tion of that amendment claims to equality in the welfare state that are
far more controversial than those of religious minorities. It extends the
benefits of the democratic welfare state to those who abuse it, suspect
its motives, and preach the need of its radical transformation. Legisla-
tors have been short-tempered with such claims of freedom, if not to
bite, at least to bark at the hand that feeds one. As in the case of
public employment, where we have seen the range of disqualification
go from active espionage, through Communist party membership, mem-
199 Id. at 543.
200 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
201 Id. at 404-05, citing Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513 (1958), Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), American Commu-
nications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), and Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S.
146 (1946). Though the withdrawal of Nestor's social security benefits had been sus-
tained, the Court now distinguished it as a "quite different case!' justified only by
"compelling federal interests," 374 U.S. 409 n.9; compelling, of course, to a different
majority from that in Sherbert.
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bership in blacklisted "subversive" organizations, unrepentant past
membership, refusal to take disclaimer oaths, and fifth amendment
claims against investigation, down to failure affirmatively to prove one's
loyalty, so also in distributing the bounties of modern social services
the legislative reflex of the 1950's was to impose political tests of
eligibility. And even more than in the hunt for subversive school
teachers and subway conductors, that reflex would find it superfluous
to seek justification in national security for the politically self-evident
purposes of striking a symbolic blow against Communism and of refus-
ing to support Communists with taxpayers' money. °2 Thus legislators
at all levels of government imposed political tests on college admissions,
scholarships, public housing, unemployment compensation, even on
drivers' licenses.03 Speiser v. Randall,"4 however, made it clear that
in withholding social benefits, no matter how "gratuitous," government
has, if anything, less discretion to disqualify than in employment.0
And to drive home the point that political as well as religious disqual-
ifications from benefits were forbidden by the first amendment, the
Court in Sherbert added a note to the sentence quoted above in order
to cite approvingly a series of lower court decisions holding such tests
unconstitutional!.20
The Sherbert opinion goes far to fortify the position of constitutional
rights against government claims of discretion to withhold "privileges."
An otherwise qualified beneficiary may not be put to a choice between
abandoning either his public benefits or his constitutionally protected
beliefs. A generation earlier, students at the University of California
had similarly been put to a choice between forfeiting the benefits of a
public education or abandoning their religious scruples against bearing
arms in the R.O.T.C. Where did the 1963 Sherbert decision leave
Hamilton v. Regents?"'7 As late as 1959, the Supreme Court had dis-
202 See 39 WASH. L. REv. 4, 39 (1964).
203 See, e.g., Willcox, supra note 168, at n.143-46.
204 357 U.S. 513 (1958).205 The Court distinguished its decisions sustaining non-communist oaths for public
or union offices as recognizing "some interest clearly within the sphere of governmental
concern .... Each case concerned a limited class of persons in or aspiring to public
positions by virtue of which they could, if evilly motivated, create serious danger to the
public safety." Id. at 527.
206 374 U.S. at 404 n.6. In addition to decisions of the supreme courts of California,
Maryland, Illinois, and Wisconsin, the Court's footnote endorsed Steinberg v. United
States, 143 Ct. Cl. 1, 163 F. Supp. 590 (1958), in which the Court of Claims had held
unconstitutional an act of Congress (a section of the "Hiss Act," 68 Stat. 1142, 5 U.S.C.§ 2282 (1954)) to cut off the annuity of any retired federal employee who, on grounds
of self-incrimination, declined to testify with respect to his former government service.
207 Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934); see text accompany-
ing note 170 supra.
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missed per curiam, with the single citation of Hamilton, an appeal by
conscientious objectors seeking to relitigate the issue of their right to
continue their studies at the University of Maryland without partic-
ipating in military training. 08 The Maryland Court of Appeals09 had
refused to consider Hamilton undermined by later Supreme Court
opinions until expressly overruled, apparently with good reason. Only
Justices Black and Douglas had dissented from the dismissal of the
appeal. In 1963, despite the holding that a state could not disregard
religious scruples in delimiting eligibility for social benefits, neither
Mr. Justice Brennan's majority opinion nor the other three opinions in
Skerbert mentioned Hamilton. But in another opinion on the same day,
Mr. Justice Brennan indicated his own doubts of its status.21 0 Whatever
that status may be with respect to military obligations imposed upon
religious pacifists, Hamilton presumably would not permit a state
university to exclude Seventh-Day Adventists who refused to attend
Saturday classes.211
Yet the fact that religious rather than secular first amendment rights
were claimed in Sherbert raised additional issues. For if denial of un-
employment benefits to a claimant who refused Saturday work by
reason of her religion prohibited her free exercise thereof under the
first amendment, might not the grant of benefits despite such a refusal
support religion in violation of that amendment's establishment clause?
Mr. Justice Stewart argued that to exempt from the "availability for
work" requirement persons unwilling to work on a given day for reli-
gious reasons would run afoul of the establishment clause as interpreted
in the Court's decisions on religion in the schools; since he disagreed
20os Hanauer v. Elkins, 358 U.S. 643 (1959).209 Hanauer v. Elkins, 217 Md. 213, 141 A.2d 903, 907 (1958).21 0 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 250 (1963). Concurring in this
decision against religious exercises in public schools, Brennan explained Hanilton as
resting on "a very narrow principle," a strong and legitimate state interest in training
a citizen militia justifying the imposition of military training as a condition upon vol-
untary attendance at a state university. "Hamilton has not been overruled," although
cases on which it relied have been, he wrote. "But if Hamilton retains any vitality with
respect to higher education, we [have] recognized its inapplicability to cognate ques-
tions in the public.primary and secondary schools... ." Id. at 250-51.
211 After an attorney general's opinion sustained a rule of the Oregon Dental School
requiring Saturday attendance over the protests of Seventh Day Adventists, 28 ORE.
Arr'Y Gzm. BiENtTAL RE'. 5 (1956-1958), the 1957 Oregon legislature allowed college
students excused absences on religious grounds "on condition that such student shall at
his own expense make up any examination, study, or work requirements." Om. REv.
STAT. 352.370 (1963). Cf. Commonwealth v. Bey, 166 Pa. Super. 136, 70 A.2d 693
(1950), holding that the religious duty to set aside Friday for worship did not excuse
Moslems from compliance with a compulsory school attendance law; noted 98 U. PA.
L. Rnv. 923 (1950).
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with those decisions, he concurred in Skerbert.212 Justices Harlan and
White, dissenting, believed that the state might not have violated its
obligation of neutrality toward religion, had it chosen to recognize an
exemption for religiously-motivated refusal of Saturday work, but that
the state was not constitutionally compelled to single out Seventh-Day
Adventists for financial benefits denied to others who might be unavail-
able for Saturday work for non-religious reasons.2 1 To these three
justices, Sherbert seemed necessarily to overrule the Court's 1961 hold-
ing that Sunday closing laws need not exempt Orthodox Jews who, for
religious reasons, refrained from work also on Saturdays.21
The dilemma, whether government must give special recognition to
the claims of religion (to respect its "free exercise") or whether it may
not do so (to avoid its "establishment"), is implicit in the first amend-
ment. It is hardly surprising that the Court has not arrived at a single
formula to resolve every conflict that invokes these competing prin-
ciples. Inevitably, the growth of the public sector has given enhanced
significance and urgency to the competing claims and, outstandingly in
the case of public support for church-related private education, has
made them a major national issue. The emergence of education as the
chief arena for church-state controversies in the United States, as it
has long been in Western Europe, has been foreshadowed in the devel-
opment of the Supreme Court's modern case law under the first sentence
of the Bill of Rights, a development that coincided with Mr. Justice
Douglas's years on the Court.
Religion in the Welfare State. The curtain was rising on a dramatic
chapter in the Court's struggles with the first amendment as Mr. Justice
Douglas came on stage. On the day he took his seat, having first sworn
to discharge his duties agreeably to the Constitution and laws, "so help
me God," the Court sustained without opinion the constitutionality of
a Massachusetts compulsory flag-salute law over the religious objec-
212 374 U.S. at 414-17 (1963).
213 Id. at 422-33.
214 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). There was no majority opinion on
Braunfeld's claim under the free-exercise clause, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan
writing a concurrent opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting, and Mr. Justice Stewart
joining the dissent of Mr. Justice Brennan, the subsequent author of Sherbert. The
justices participating in the majority in both Braunfeld and Sherbert were Black, Clark,
and the Chief Justice. In his dissent in the Sunday closing cases, Douglas quoted
Seattle's Rev. Allan C. Parker, Jr., to support his conclusion that the choice of the
Christian majority's Sunday as a compulsory day of rest was an unconstitutional
establishment as well as a burden on the "free exercise" of minority religions who
worship on another day. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 578-81 (1961).
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tions of Seventh-Day Adventists, citing Hamilton v. Regents.15 Within
a year, a contrary decision by lower federal courts compelled full-dress
review. In an opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court
held that Pennsylvania could require daily flag salutes from public
school children as means toward "promotion of national cohesion" and
"to evoke that unifying sentiment without which there can ultimately
be no liberties, civil or religious," without having to exempt Jehovah's
Witnesses." 6 Only Mr. Justice Stone dissented. Three years later, he
was joined by five brethren in overruling that decision in Board of
Education v. Barnette.17 But Mr. Justice Jackson's new majority
opinion in Barnette did not claim any special religious exemption for
the protesting minority. Under the first amendment government may
not compel anyone to an affirmation of a belief or an attitude of mind
by symbolic ritual any more than by words. If it was remarkable that
the unconstitutionality of compulsory patriotic exercises should be
announced in the middle of a great war, recollection of what the war
was against weighed heavily in the decision. "We live by symbols,"
Mr. Justice Frankfurter had written in 1940. "It mocks reason and
denies our whole history to find in the allowance of a requirement to
salute our flag on fitting occasions the seeds of sanction for obeisance
to a leader."21 "Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the
unanimity of the graveyard," wrote Mr. Justice Jackson in 1943. "The
case is made difficult not because the principles of its decision are
obscure but because the flag involved is our own. 2 . Of the new major-
ity, two were recent appointees, but Justices Black, Douglas, and Mur-
phy had reversed their position since 1940 and felt impelled to elucidate
beyond merely concurring in the Jackson opinion. Mr. Justice Douglas
joined in Black's explanation that, on reflection, their strong views
against imposing due process review on state regulatory policy were
inappropriate to a first amendment case. But unlike the majority's
broad first amendment premises of general freedom from compulsory
215 April 17, 1939. See 306 U.S. III n.4; Johnson v. Deerfield, 306 U.S. 621 (1939);
see also Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, ibid. (California law, cert. den.) ; Leoles v. Land-
ers, 302 U.S. 656 (1937) (Georgia law) and Hering v. State Bd. of Educ., 303 U.S.
624 (1938) (New Jersey law) the latter two dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question. For a thorough analysis of the cases before Sherbert, see KULAxND, REixLGoN
AND THE LAw (1962) ; Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U.
Cmi. L Rv. 1 (1961).2 10 Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595-97 (1940).
217 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Judge Parker, writing for the district court, 47 F. Supp. 251
(S.D. W. Va. 1942), had correctly anticipated the demise of Gobitis from the opinions
in Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942).21 8 Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 596, 598 (1940).
219 Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
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ideological utterance, with possible overtones even from the establish-
ment clause, their concurring opinion stressed the religious liberty of
the dissenting Jehovah's Witnesses.220 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a
dissent restating his earlier views, forecast the difficult implications of
the Court's assumption of judicial responsibility for such future issues
as Bible reading in public schools and free textbooks or transportation
for parochial school students.22'
The Court has evaded the difficulties Frankfurter sought to avoid.
In 1947, in Everson v. Board of Education,222 it sustained the constitu-
tionality of state-paid bus transportation of students to non-profit pri-
vate schools which, in practice, meant parochial schools. Mr. Justice
Douglas joined Mr. Justice Black's opinion to make a bare majority
of five. The following year, in McCollum v. Board of Education,223
eight Justices agreed that the Constitution forbade religious instruction
by private denominational teachers in the public schools for students
whose parents requested this "released time" while other children
stayed at their regular studies. Douglas again joined Black's majority
opinion. But in 1952, it was Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the
majority in Zorach v. Clauson,22' who led the retreat from the Court's
effort to separate church and public school. In perhaps his least happy
constitutional opinion, he distinguished New York's program under the
establishment clause--"This 'released time' program involves neither
religious instruction in public school classrooms nor the expenditure of
public funds"-and the free exercise clause--"no one is forced to go
to the religious classroom... A student need not take religious instruc-
tion.. 2. A footnote disposed of the crucial point on which analysis
of the protesting students' claims under both clauses must turn-the
practical differences between "released time" and "dismissed time"-
by a grudging reading of the facts: "Nor is there any indication that
the public schools enforce attendance at religious schools by punishing
absentees from the released time programs for truancy. 226 If any
child could leave the school, to go home or to play the pinball machine
at the corner drugstore, released time would be constitutional; the
220 Id. at 643.
221 Id. at 659-61. Justices Roberts and Reed, also dissenting, stood by the Gobitis
opinion. Id. at 642.
222330 U.S. 1 (1947).
222 333 U.S. 203 (1948). There were two concurring opinions; Mr. Justice Reed
dissented.
224 343 U.S. 306 (1952).2 25 Id. at 308.
2216 Id. at 311 n.6.
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Zorach record did not show otherwise."' It seems unlikely that this is
what New York and the sponsors of released time had in mind. But it
was clear which premises of the opinion were in the footnotes and
which in the text: "We are a religious people whose institutions pre-
suppose a Supreme Being," wrote Douglas. "When the state encourages
religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjust-
ing the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best
of our traditions. 228
That same year, Mr. Justice Douglas had been prepared to reach
the issue of Bible reading in public schools, but the Court had denied
that taxpayers had standing to prosecute an appeal to the Supreme
Court though a state court had decided against them on the merits.2 '
It bought the Court a ten-year delay. But in the school prayer and
Bible reading cases of 1962 and 1963, the Court reached the constitu-
tional decision that devotional exercises could not be incorporated in
the instructional program of public schools.3 0 Mr. Justice Douglas
wrote concurring opinions in both cases. In both he found the forbidden
establishment in the fact that public funds were spent to support a
religious exercise. He chose to meet head-on the implications of this
premise in the politically most visible analogy, the religious invocations
customary in government itself.
[The] teacher who leads in prayer is on the public payroll; and the
time she takes seems minuscule as compared with the salaries appro-
priated by state legislatures and Congress for chaplains to conduct
prayers in the legislative halls. Only a bare fraction of the teacher's
time is given to reciting this short 22-word prayer, about the same
amount of time that our Crier spends announcing the opening of our
sessions and offering a prayer for this Court. Yet for me the principle
is the same... for in each of the instances given the person praying is
a public official on the public payroll, performing a religious exercise
in a governmental institution.231
227 Ibid. The New York courts had refused a trial on the factual issues; Mr. Justice
Douglas accepted this "adequate state ground' Id. at 311 n.7.2 28 Id. at 314. The opinion evoked dissents by Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Jack-
son, the last exceeding even his characteristic intemperateness: "The distinction at-
tempted between [McCollun] and this is trivial, almost to the point of cynicism....
Today's judgment will be more interesting to students of psychology and of the judicial
processes than to students of constitutional law," id. at 325. Between the two "released
time" decisions, Justices Clark and Minton had replaced Murphy and Rutledge of the
McCollums majority, Burton and Chief Justice Vinson made the swing with Douglas.229 Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 435 (1952).230Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963).
281 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 441 (1962).
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Repudiating his vote as the fifth member of the Everson majority that
sustained free bus tickets for parochial school students, since its theory
would equally support publicly paid school lunches, books, or tuition,
Douglas retrospectively endorsed the Rutledge dissent.2 Money, not
coercion, established churches in the welfare state; he italicized it the
next year: "The most effective way to establish any institution is to
finance it; and this truth is reflected in the appeals by church groups
for public funds to finance their religious schools." Furthermore, he
spelled out his view that no public facilities or funds may "in any way"
add to the strength that churches derive directly from their members,
even if the public support is allocated to church activities separable
from religious exercises as such." 3
Another article in the Washington Law Review has surveyed Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas' position on religion from Jones v. Opelika"3' to Schempp,
and the same ground will not be covered here. 35 The present study
reviews not so much the specific limits of constitutional rights but,
rather, their position in the public sector. The question is whether the
guarantees of liberty remain the same when the welfare state provides
public benefits and services as they are when government seeks to
regulate private conduct by law. To pose in this manner the problem
of the "establishment" and "free exercise" of religion can help separate
what should be irrelevant from that which is difficult in the constitu-
tional decision. Immaterial to Hamilton's complaint was the fact that
it was a state university in which California made R.O.T.C. compul-
sory. As far as the first amendment is concerned, California's power
must be tested by whether it could require military training of students
at all colleges, private as well as public. When West Virginia undertook
to compel the flag salute at public schools, it must be prepared to de-
fend its constitutional power to require the same at private schools,
232 Id. at 443; Mr. Justice Douglas had already indicated in 1961 that he was pre-
pared to reconsider Everson in voting to note probable jurisdiction when the Court
dismissed an appeal from a Connecticut parochial school transportation case, Snyder v.
Town of Newtown, 365 U.S. 299 (1961).23
1 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 229 (1963).
234 316 U.S. 584 (1942).
235 Manning, The Douglas Concept of God in Government, 39 WASH. L. Rv. 47
(1964). See also Louisell, The Man and the Mountain: Douglas on Religious Freedom,
73 YALE L. J. 975 (1964), and from a vast literature on the recent constitutional law of
religion, KURLAND, op. cit. supra note 207; Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A
Proposed Constitutional Standard, 47 MiNN. L. REv. 330 (1963) ; KATZ, RELIGI N AND
Am~acAx CONSTrUnONS (1963); Pollak, Foreword, The Supreme Court, 1962 Term,
77 HAgv. L REv. 62 (1963); Fordham, The Implications of the Supreme Court Deci-
sions Dealing with Religious Practices in the Public Schools, 6 J CHuacH & S. 44(1964) ; Jones, The Constitutional Status of Public Funds for Church-Related Schools,
id. at 61.
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though it might not in fact do so. When the constitutional question
is thus posed, some apparently difficult answers become almost self-
evident. New York or Pennsylvania have broad authority over the
curriculum that will satisfy the standards of a compulsory school at-
tendance law, but would anyone argue that these standards could have
included a requirement of the "Regents' Prayer" or daily Bible read-
ings for all schools, private as well as public, without falling afoul of
the establishment clause? 280
However, by focusing on a sharply distinct issue of financial "estab-
lishment" beyond any question of compulsion on dissenters-whether
explicit, as in the Sunday closing or the flag salute cases, or through
social pressure, as claimed in the released time and school prayer cases
-Douglas moved the frontier of judicial debate toward confrontation
with the real dilemma of religion in the welfare state; for it has become
the essence of the welfare state to pursue social goals with money rather
than with laws." ' It is not surprising that much of the public outcry
following the prayer decision was directed at the implications drawn
in the Douglas concurrence. Of course it is a fair criticism that to
focus on the pay of public school teachers who lead prayers appears
to seize upon a trivial rather than a real constitutional interest. No
doubt scheduled prayers in public schools led by unpaid, outside volun-
teers are equally an "establishment."23 8 And the mere broad statement
of a doctrine against financial support of religion "in any way" scarcely
conceals an economist's nightmare of unresolved problems of applica-
tion and of protection for the "free exercise" of religion. If a community
may not pay the bus fares of parochial school students, must a munic-
ipal transit system plan of free rides for children exclude or include
288 A Comment, Private Tutoring, Compulsory Education and the Illinois Supreme
Court, 18 U. CHL L. Rav. 105 (1950) reviewed some of the other constitutional difficul-
ties courts have seen in delimiting state control over education, citing, inter alia, State
v. Counort, 69 Wash. 361, 124 Pac. 910 (1912). Apart from the deprivation of a private
economic stake in education, a factor in the mid-nineteen-twenties due-process jurispru-
dence of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925), and Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927), any constitutional
liberty of parents and of children that might be claimed against a state-prescribed
course of study in private education [e.g., evolution in Biology, sex education in
Health-cf. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629 (1943)
(Frankfurter dissenting)] could equally be claimed to excuse public school children
from the same courses in public schools. Of course private schools may voluntarily
pursue religious studies and exercises that the public schools may not; the stated test
for the public sector is not what the private sector is free to do but what government
could constitutionally require it to do.
237 See Part I, 39 WAsH. L. REV. 4, 9 (1964).2 38 McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) ; cf. Mr. Justice Brennan,
concurring, in Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 261.
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such students?.. 9 Surely the mere form of ownership of public transit
facilities should make no more constitutional difference here than in
the employment or "captive audience" cases.2"' If the source of capital
and operating funds were alone decisive, would the establishment
clause be violated when a state university-based educational television
station broadcasts a religious program, but not when the Federal Com-
munications Commission requires a private station to set aside time
for religious broadcasts in its program schedule? And what about
opportunities for the free exercise of their religion for those isolated
within the public sector-not only in the military forces and veterans'
hospitals, but in state institutions, county hospitals, Indian schools?
Could N.A.S.A. ground stations broadcast Sunday sermons to astro-
nauts on their way to the moon?...
Despite obvious difficulties, Mr. Justice Douglas has, nevertheless,
chosen in his concurring opinions to emphasize the issue of finance as
the central question of the constitutional position of religion in an
expanding public sector. "Establishment" can be avoided only by
keeping churches, their ceremonies, their proselytizing and educational
programs, and their financing in the private sector. This emphasis is
realistic although it discloses as many dilemmas as it resolves. But its
implication is also plain. In a society that separates church and state,
religion must depend on the maintenance of a strong and prospering
private sector within which individuals, in order to exercise the freedom
239 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S., 1, 17 (1947). The construction of such
problems happily occupies constitutional law scholars in commenting on first amend-
ment cases and in writing examination questions; e.g., if the community cannot build a
gymnasium for use by students attending parochial schools, must it deny them free
admission for group swimming lessons at a municipal pool? Can a parochial school
teacher assign her class outside reading in books to be obtained from the public library?
Perhaps her students may go for examinations by a public health nurse or dentist but
the latter not visit the parochial school. Yet current experiments toward designing
"shared time" schemes make such speculations far from academic.
240 See 39 WASH. L. REv. 39-46 (1964).
241 Concern about religious establishment through financing and through public ed-
ucation is not a recent discovery but was expressed quite specifically by the draftsmen
of state constitutions in the nineteenth century, under which state courts have long im-
posed even more stringent separation of church and state than the United States
Supreme Court. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 11, amended in 1904 and 1958 spe-
cifically to permit the employment of chaplains for inmates of state institutions; art.
9, § 4; Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist., 33 Wn.2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949)
(no school bus travel to parochial schools), State v. Showalter, 159 Wash. 519, 293
Pac. 1000 (1930) (no Bible study in public schools), State v. Frazier, 102 Wash. 369,
173 Pac. 35 (1918) (no public school credits for private Bible study); cf. Dickman v.
School Dist. 62C, 232 Or. 238, 366 P2d 533 (1961) (no public text-books for parochial
schools). On a recent phenomenon raising issues of religious minorities in institutions,
see Comment, Black Muslims in Prison: Of Muslim Rites and Constitutional Rights,
62 CoLumx. L. Ray. 1488 (1962); Brown, Th7e Developing Criteria for Judicial Review
of Complaints of Religious Discrimination Against Black Muslim Prisoners, 32 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 1124 (1964).
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guaranteed them by the first amendment, are able to direct resources
into channels closed to the state.
And private resources must be available for direction not only into
channels dosed by constitutional interdiction, but also those dosed
by political choice. The establishment clause makes the corollary of
a flourishing and decentralized private sector most compelling for the
position of religion, but it is hardly less realistic for the position of the
other first amendment freedoms. For, unlike the case of religion, gov-
ernment is free to support scientific study, creative publication, and
the dissemination of critical opinion or artistic expression. But how
much, except for the existence of private resources, can the first amend-
ment do to assure a hearing to ideas which government deems unworthy
of support by the public sector? President de Gaulle decrees that the
Voice of France may be heard over the state's broadcast network but
not the voices of the opposition. For the unorthodox writer or artist
in Eastern Europe, censorship may no longer mean peril to his personal
security, but, instead, only a lack of commissions from state orchestras,
film producers, public construction projects, or rejection slips from
state publishing houses faced with "paper shortages"-and from the
standpoint of the administrators, their selections may not be censorship
at all but the prudent and responsible use of limited public resources.
In such a market painters will turn out socialist realism for the public
museums and hang their abstract expressionist experiments in each
others' homes. We need not point so far afield. U.S. Government grants
can be expected to sustain study of electronic miniaturization but not
electronic music, of modem Chinese economics but not medieval Chi-
nese poetry; and the American use of political tests for both teachers
and scholars has already been discussed in this article.242 A McCarthy
committee can stir righteous indignation by disclosing that the United
States Information Service buys for overseas libraries books which
have been written by authors who could not have passed a government
security check. To qualify for the national schoolbook market, almost
completely in the public sector, a text must pasteurize and homogenize
the facts of American history, society, and language in deference to
the regional, religious, racial, and nationality sensitivities of countless
school board members, taxpayers, and self-appointed vigilantes of the
public funds. A court may order that taxes be collected and spent on
242 See 39 WAsH. L. REv. 4, 37-46 (1964) and note 195 supra. Since the appearance
of the first installment, Washington's loyalty oaths, see 39 WAsH. L. REV. 4, 38 n.138
(1964), have been held void for vagueness. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
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public schools to assure the equal protection of state laws;2 .3 but could
it find, under the first amendment or the fourteenth, that a book has
been excluded for constitutionally impermissible reasons from a public
library, whether of a county school or of the U.S.I.S., and substitute
judicial criteria of selection for those found invalid?
In securing the affirmative exercise of first amendment freedoms, we
thus encounter limits on constitutional rights in the public sector,
legal limits in the case of religion, and practical limits in the areas
of secular opinion or creative expression. As concerns the distribution
of grants, benefits, or services by reasonably objectifiable criteria-
social security, welfare, access to public housing, hospitals, and schools
-the developing judicial doctrines can meet the interrelated constitu-
tional claims that correspond to those discussed in the preceding section
on the right to work. 44 The first amendment claim not to be disqual-
ified for unorthodoxy of opinion falling short of validly forbidden
conduct, the claim to fair procedures in determining disqualification,
and the claim that eligibility for the benefits of the welfare state-
increasingly essential to whole generations before they qualify to enter
the labor market, while they are in it, and after they leave it-not be
denied by standards and procedures that could not constitutionally
be applied in government regulation of the private sector.24 In Sher-
bert v. Verner the first of these claims, against disqualification for
unorthodoxy, seems to have been written into constitutional law.246 As
to the second claim, when a person's interest in the public sector has
once been held entitled to the guarantees of the equal protection clause
or the first amendment in the face of the state's defense of "discretion"
and "mere privilege," can that same interest long be denied the con-
stitutional guarantees of fair procedures? Such guarantees for a stake
in public acts often labeled "gratuities," in grants, benefits, and serv-
ices as well as in employment, licenses, and contracts, are a main
frontier of today's constitutional law. Once the fourteenth amend-
ment's substantive standard of equality had compelled a state to extend
the service of a university education to a qualified student, its proce-
dural standard of due process would apply to withdrawal of that service
by expulsion. 47 In two recent studies, Charles Reich has pointed out
243 Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
244 39 WASH. L. REV. 4, 31-46 (1964).
245 Cf. id. at 42.
246 See text accompanying notes 200-07.
247 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F2d 150 (1961). Among the extensive
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that virtually everyone's stake in the modem public sector is econom-
ically, and should be legally recognized as, akin to the forms of
"property" which the eighteenth century thought essential to individual
liberty; and that government methods of control may invade constitu-
tional liberties as ruthlessly in administering the welfare state as in
enforcing the penal controls over private conduct which were the his-
toric premise of American constitutional guarantees."4 8 Might not the
third claim, against arbitrary disqualification, lead to the development
of a constitutional requirement of relevance similar to that expressed
by Mr. Justice Douglas for the right to work in Beilan and Barsky?249
But even judicial demarcation of all these claims could secure that
constitutional frontier only against disqualification from social benefits
granted in terms of general categories. How could courts assure af-
firmative rights to effective self-expression of the kind whose very
individuality makes it the special ward of the first amendment and
simultaneously places it beyond any objectifiable criteria of eligibility
for public support?
current literature on the procedural rights of students, see Van Alstyne, Procedural
Due Process and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 368 (1963), Van Al-
styne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making Powers of Public Univer-
sities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 2 LAw ix TRAN oiN Q. 1 (1965) and
literature cited id. at 2 n.3. Comment, Private Government on the Campus-Judicial Re-
view of University Expulsions, 72 YA.La L.J. 1362 (1963), Comment, The Constitutional
Rights of College Students, 42 TEx L. Ray. 344 (1964). On another group of benefi-
ciaries, see Davis, Veterans' Benefits, Judicial Review, and the Constitutional Problems
of Positive Government, 39 IND. L.J. 183, 216-24 (1964). Cf., for the view that inter-
ests protected against unconstitutional substantive action may not necessarily be entitled
to procedural protection, the discussion of Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886 (1961), in 1 DAvIs, AD INISTRATI LAW § 7.11-.12 (1963). But compare
Newman, The Process of Prescribing "Due Process;" 49 CAssn. L. REv. 215, 218
(1961): "The privilege doctrine should be junked, and 'life, liberty, or property' should
be treated as a description of all legal interests." Id. at n.11: "Professor Davis con-
cludes, "Instead of two categories [right and privilege] we could have six or twenty,
from the weakest privilege or absence of privilege to the strongest constitutional
right....' I prefer three categories: life, liberty, and property. Many interests are not
legal interests and thus are not life, liberty, or property interests. Those that are, how-
ever (and I suggest the torts cases as guides), merit due process protection."
248 Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964), Midnight Welfare Searches
and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347 (1963).249 Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958); Barsky v. Board of Re-
gents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954). See 39 WAsH. L. Ray. 4, 38-40 (1964). In Speiser v. Ran-
dall, 357 U.S. 513, 527-28 (1958), the Court held that disclaimers of disloyalty had
greater relevance to a genuine governmental interest in the employment cases than in
withholding a benefit such as tax exemption; see note 205 supra. In an opinion as
circuit justice, Mr. Justice Douglas has suggested that "A doctor might well go to prison
for a misdeed in connection with his practice and yet not automatically lose his right to
practice medicine. Deprivation of a professional license should require a hearing, since
broader issues than those in the criminal case are involved, e.g., whether the misdeed
is of a character to make it unsafe and improvident for the State to entrust a medical
license to that person," citing Reich, supra, note 248. Rehman v. State of California,
85 Sup. Ct. 8 (1964).
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A generation after Burleson and Hamilton,25 ° the public sector daily
offers concrete illustrations for such abstract speculations. As this ar-
ticle is written, the U. S. Naval Acadamy reaffirms compulsory church
attendance for its midshipmen.25' The local press reports the battle in
a nearby school district over the removal and subsequent reinstatement
of The Catcher in the Rye in the school library. The U. S. State
Department worries about the selection of paintings for an exhibit
representative of American art. The University of Oregon has pio-
neered in the adoption of a new student discipline code that approx-
imates the procedural safeguards of Oregon's Administrative Procedure
Act, only to find it at once jeopardized by external demands for Univer-
sity sanctions against off-campus offenses; yet if the state may constitu-
tionally withhold educational (or other social) benefits as a form of
punishment for unrelated misconduct, what in the Constitution would
keep a state from equally disqualifying the offender from private educa-
tion? If a rubber check artist is a bad risk for a B.S. degree from State,
he is a bad risk for a B.S. from a private college; the fourteenth amend-
ment may not prevent state-imposed disqualification from the private
degree, but if it does, the constitutional limitation should equally govern
the state college. 52 Again, the proper constitutional test for State is
not what a private college might be free to do, but what government
might constitutionally prescribe for it; and again, for the student's
claim to share in the welfare state courts can develop workable criteria
of relevance. But the University of Oregon has recently suspended
publication of a literary magazine after protests against its publication
of some offensive poetry. The state could not have censored or sus-
pended a private periodical, but what constitutional doctrine or what
judicial remedy could assure a poem an affirmative right to publication
in a state college magazine-or this article in the Washington Law
Review? Such questions will become increasingly relevant as literature
and the arts win the kind of support from the public sector already
familiar in Europe and elsewhere outside the United States, for the-
atres, art galleries, orchestras, perhaps even the broadcast media, as
well as through the existing public libraries and educational institutions,
250 United States v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921), Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
251 Portland Oregonian, June 7, 1964, p. 19. Cf. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 438
n.2.
252 To what extent states may prescribe standards for private education, cf. Com-
ment, supra note 226.
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their university presses and educational TV channels."' Perhaps an-
swers can be sought in the diffusion of management within the public
sector and the deliberate insulation of its cultural activities from the
main arenas of politics. But experience shows such insulation to be
fragile at best, and it is in any case not constitutionally required. The
political managers responsible for the public sector, whether on a
school board, in a legislature, or in the Kremlin, will continue to feel
obliged to judge books bought or published with public funds, statues
and murals commissioned for public buildings, the men who staff the
universities or cultural centers.
In the end, the first amendment's freedoms of religious and secular
diversity and dissent find their economic guarantees in a diversified and
diffused private sector, where courts can protect constitutional liberty
by stopping rather than by compelling government action, applying
the great negatives of the Bill of Rights in their 18th century context
of negative government rather than having to translate them into pos-
itive commands to the 20th century positive state. This translation is
not impossible: "The Bill of Rights does not say.., what government
must give, but rather what it may not take away," Mr. Justice Douglas
wrote in Barsky v. Board of Regents,254 concerning government with-
drawal of the right to work, whether in public or private employment.
253 Eric Larrabee recently reported:
"The most conspicuous of all dissimilarities between the positions accorded culture on
two sides of the Atlantic is the European custom of governmental subsidy.... It takes
various forms, from grants to individual writers (as in Italy) or aid to artists and
musicians (as in France) to the partial underwriting of the expenses of publishing (as
in Austria and Greece) and direct subsidies covering the major costs of theaters and
operas (as in West Germany in particular but nearly every other nation as well)....
West Germany spent $67 million in 1960 to meet two thirds of the budgetary needs of
128 theaters and operas.... At the same time, in Great Britain the Arts Council makes
grants to Covent Garden, Sadler's Wells, the Old Vic, and so on; while in France the
Ministry of Culture subsidizes the Op&a, the Opera Comique, the Com~die Frangaise,
the Thitre Nationale Populaire, the Thatre de France, and dozens of other regional
and private theaters. The result is a fantastically lessened burden to the ticket buyer."
But he went on to point out: "What distinguishes America on this point is the re-
luctance to be committed as to what is, and is not, art. Our separation of church and
state, which implies a certain reverence, is matched by a separation of culture and state
which implies a certain respect. ... The trouble with Europe's generosity to art, judged
by American standards, is that it subsumes a frozen definition of what art, or indeed
culture, is.... Who is to decide? Often the choice is made by bureaucrats, as in Italy,
where the writers to receive grants are picked by officials in the equivalent of the
American copyright office, and, so it is said, novelists such as Silone and Moravia have
never been among those selected. The Establishment giveth, the Establishment taketh
away." Larrabee, Transcripts of a Transatlantic Dialogue, Daedalus, Winter 1964,
468-70. A California court has recently held government subsidy of a film of a re-
ligious parade to be forbidden by the establishment clause. County of Los Angeles v.
Hollinger, 221 Cal. App2d 154, 34 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1963) ; see also Ezer, Book Review,
11 U.C.L.A.L. RLv. 174 (1963).
254 347 U.S. 442 (1954). See 39 WAsH. L. Rxv. 4,40 n.141 (1964).
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But the answer he gave to the Marxist thesis that the ownership of
production determines all cultural and intellectual life was the mixed
economy of the Human Welfare State.
"By communist standards [a] state that encourages free enterprise or
pluralism in economic organization, or free speech or religion, or any
of the earmarks of an independent people must be destroyed," he said in
1949. "We place our faith in a society that preserves greatest possible
freedom for the individual yet secures the masses in their basic needs." 255
VII. LIBERTY IN PUBLIC PLACES
The issues of constitutional rights in employment, and in government
benefits and services, are equally present when government owns or
finances real property. Land-streets, buildings, parks-is among the
simplest and oldest forms of the public sector. When a school board
makes rules for the schoolhouse, is it landowner or government? The
premise is as decisive here as for its relationship to its teachers and
students.25 And as before, we begin with an assumption that public
property may be managed at government discretion like private prop-
erty, and we end with a rule that public funds, public regulation, or the
performance of public functions may bring even "private" property
under constitutional restraints.
Once again, the conventional premise had become classic through
being announced by Judge Holmes in Massachusetts. William F. Davis
challenged as unconstitutional an ordinance prohibiting "in or upon
any of the public grounds, any public address... [without] a permit
from the mayor," under which he was convicted for making a speech
in Boston Common. "The argument to that effect involves the same
kind of fallacy that was dealt with in McAuliffe v. New Bedford," '257
wrote Holmes. "For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid
public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement
of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private
house to forbid it in his house.258 The United States Supreme Court
affirmed in Davis v. Massachusetts,'5" largely in reliance on Holmes's
opinion. The state's power "to absolutely exclude all right to use,
255 Douglas, The Human Welfare State, Remsen Bird Lecture, Occidental College,
97 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 600-07 (1949). See 39 WASH. L. REv. 4, 10-11 (1964).
256 See 39 WAsH. L. Rv. 4, 39 (1964) and note 247 supra.
257 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
258 Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895).
259 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897). For the subsequent views of Mr. Justice Holmes and
others on "unconstitutional conditions," compare notes 167, 168 supra.
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necessarily includes the authority to determine under what circum-
stances such use may be availed of, as the greater power contains the
lesser."280
But the Court to which Mr. Justice Douglas was appointed forty
years later was not concerned whether the citizen on the public grounds
was there by a property right or by special invitation. In 1938 it had
unanimously decided that an ordinance requiring written permission
from the city manager to distribute literature was void on its face.2 6'
Douglas took his seat in April 1939, too late to participate in Hague v.
C.I.O. 26 2 which had been argued in February. The decision cast doubt
on the continued validity of Davis v. Massachusetts when it rejected
the contention of Jersey City officials, as stated by Mr. Justice Roberts,
that "the city's ownership of streets and parks is as absolute as one's
ownership of his home, with consequent power altogether to exclude
citizens from the use thereof," a power they had used to drive C.I.O.
spokesmen from public streets, parks and buildings.26 During the next
five years, the Court opened the streets to the exercise of first amend-
ment freedoms over a variety of local restraints. 64 These freedoms
were seen as confronting the community's powers to maintain public
order rather than its interests as the owner of public "property," and
only narrowly defined police controls, without official discretion over
the purpose or content of the privileged activity, were sustained. 65
When the city of Dallas invoked Davis to claim an absolute power over
its streets, the Court replied, "[T]his same argument, made in reliance
260 Id. at 48.
201 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
262 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
263 Id. at 514. There were three separate majority positions, divided on the appli-
cability of the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, but there
seemed to be agreement on Mr. Justice Robert's statement: "We have no occasion to
determine whether, on the facts disclosed, the Davis case was rightly decided, but we
cannot agree that it rules the instant case." Id. at 515. Only Mr. Justice Butler, dis-
senting, argued for sustaining Jersey City's ordinance on the principle of Davis, id. at
533. In Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 561, n2 (1948), Mr. Justice Douglas cited
Hague as stating the majority's view of Davis.
264 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (distribution of handbills and door-to-
door religious canvassing without a permit) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940)
and Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940) (picketing to publicize labor dispute) ;
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (religious solicitation without permit) ;
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) and Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943)(distribution of handbills and religious publications); Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S.
584 (1941), rev'd 319 U.S. 103 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania 319 U.S. 105 (1943),
Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) (license tax for solicitation of religous
donations or book sales), and Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (door-to-
door religious canvassing); Follet v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944)
(license tax). Mr. Justice Douglas wrote the majority opinions in Jones, Murdock,
and Follet.
265 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
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upon the same decision, has been directly rejected by this Court" in
Hague v. C.I.O."'
The issues continued to be posed in terms opposing regulation for
public order against freedom from discretionary or prior restraints on
speech, rather than in terms of management of public real estate, when
the pendulum swung the other way after 1949.2"7 Yet when the con-
troversy moved from the street into the parks, Davis proved not to
have been finally laid to rest. In Fowler v. Rhode Island,"' Mr. Justice
Douglas wrote for the Court: "[M]uch of the oral argument and most
of the briefs have been devoted on the one hand to a defense of the
Davis case and on the other hand to an attack on it.... We are invited
by appellant to overrule it; we are asked by respondent to reaffirm it."
But he continued, "We put to one side the problems presented by the
Davis case and its offspring."2 ' Pawtucket, Rhode Island's ordinance
could be invalidated for discrimination against Jehovah's Witnesses as
compared to other religious denominations.27 In the following month,
the Court held that even a wrongful denial of a permit to use a public
park, under a nondiscriminatory requirement similar to that sustained
in Cox v. New Hampshire, afforded no constitutional immunity from
prosecution."' Mr. Justice Douglas, with Mr. Justice Black, argued in
dissent that the holding sanctioned a previous restraint.2 But even
the majority opinion rested the validity of the permit requirement on
the limited objectives of "peace, order and tranquillity" and "comfort
2
06 Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1943).
267 In 1949, the Court dismissed, Justices Black and Douglas dissenting, an appeal
challenging a New York City requirement of permits to speak in a park, which New
York courts had found limited to non-discriminatory application of "the sole standard
... of the beauty and utility of the public parks." People v. Hass, 299 N.Y 681, 86
NE.2d 169, 87 N.E2d 68, appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 803 (1949). In 1951, the Court
reversed convictions for speaking when permits were denied for arbitrary or invalid
reasons, Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1950), Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S.
290 (1951), but affirmed the disorderly conduct conviction of a street speaker whose
political harangue threatened to cause crowd violence, Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S.
315 (1951), and sustained the application to magazine subscription salesmen of a
"Green River ordinance" against uninvited door-to-door solicitation, Breard v. Alexan-
dria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). Cf. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); and Geuss v. Pennsylvania, 342 U.S. 912 (1952) (sound-
truck cases), Douglas writing for the Court in Saia and dissenting in Kovacs and
Geuss. Cf. Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Hughes v. Superior
Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950) (development of the "unlawful objective" limitation on
peaceful picketing).
268 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
269 Id. at 68-69.
270 This admission by counsel for Rhode Island brought the case within Niemotko v.
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
271 Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953).
272 Id. at 426.
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and convenience" in the use of the grounds, unrelated to any judgment
concerning the speaker or his speech; Davis was not mentioned.27
Public order is a legitimate concern of government on private as
well as on public land. Are the constitutional limits less stringent when
government denies the right to speak on public property than on
private? The community as landowner has an additional, managerial
role in allocating public property fairly to competing users, consistent
with its intended function and its physical and economic preservation.
Apart from discrimination among users, controlled by the equal protec-
tion clause, such practical needs of public order and functional man-
agement, rather than any absolute rights of ownership, delimit the
authority of government to withdraw its property from uses protected
by the first amendment. The community may not ban all public speech
and religious pursuits from its streets and parks; does the first amend-
ment also open public buildings to all comers willing to comply with
reasonable rules of time, space, and conditions of use?
In 1946 the California Supreme Court, while retaining the traditional
premise that "the state is under no duty to make school buildings avail-
able for public meetings," found the denial of first amendment freedoms
rather than equal protection to be the vice in a statute that denied
"subversive elements" the use of school buildings as "civic centers." '27
"Since the state cannot compel 'subversise elements' directly to re-
nounce their convictions and affiliations, it cannot make such a renun-
ciation a condition of receiving the privilege of free assembly in a
school building," wrote Justice Traynor.
The convictions and affiliations of one who requests the use of a school
building as a forum is of no more concern to the school administrators
than to a superintendent of parks or streets if the forum is the green or
the market place.... [T]he state need not open the doors of a school
building as a forum and may at- any time choose to close them. Once it
opens the doors, however, it cannot demand tickets of admission in the
form of convictions and affiliations that it deems acceptable.275
273 Id. at 405-07.
2U74 Section 19432 of the Civic Center Act, CAL. EDuc. CoDE 19431-39, defined subver-
sive element" in terms of affiliation with any organization advocating violent overthrow
of government.
275 Danshen v. San Diego Unified School ist, 28 Cal.2d 536, 171 P2d 885, 891-92
(1 ). p aneg e Inc., 327 U.S. 146(1946) and United States v. Burleson, 225 U.S. 407 (1921), see text accompanying
notes 166, 173 supra; Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937), Hague v. C.T.O., 307
U.S. 496 (1939), and the first amendment decisions of the early 1940's for the conclu-
sion that, even as applied to non-criminal restraints, the clear-and-present-danger test
had become the constitutional limit of state infringement of speech.
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The Supreme Court of the United States has avoided occasions for
endorsing this logical extension of its decisions. When the New York
courts sustained the discretion of its boards of education to grant the
use of a schoolhouse to a group or to deny it on the ground that it
might lead to controversy and "dissatisfaction and criticism" in local
opinion, the Court granted certiorari but after two arguments voted
5-4 (Mr. Justice Douglas among the dissenters) to dismiss the writ
as improvidently granted.276 And the Court denied certiorari when the
California Supreme Court, after reaffirming its constitutional doctrine,
sustained a revised requirement limited to an advance statement dis-
avowing illegal use of the school building. 7
The community may not deny freedom of speech in public places.
But what are public places, and what is the community? Two cases
reaching the Court midway in its course between the trailbreaking
opinions of the early 1940's and the second thoughts of the 1950's
showed that the answer does not depend on title to property.2 8 In
each, a Jehovah's Witness had been convicted under state law for
refusing to leave property on notification by the owner. The property
in each, however, was a "company town," owned, building, streets, and
all, in one case by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation, in the other
by the federal government. Though the rules had been made by the
owners, not the states, the convictions were reversed. It might have
been easy to hold that the federal government, at least, could no more
than any state, make rules driving religious or other proselytizers from
its streets. But the Court first held that even private ownership would
not sustain such ground rules for land whose use in fact met all other
characteristics of a community, a "typical American town;" the fed-
erally-owned village was treated as only another kind of company
town. 9 The Court rejected Alabama's contention, as stated by Mr.
276 Ellis v. Dixon, 349 U.S. 458 (1955). The New York judge had written: "The
Board is presumed to have knowledge of local conditions, and to know the sentiment
of the taxpayers and voters in the district. Assuming that a proposed use is in itself
legitimate, a Board of Education may still find that the sentiment of the community
is divided as to the propriety of the use and may properly refuse a request, the granting
of which would result in dissatisfaction and criticism .... The objects and purposes
of petitioner's organization [The "Yonkers Committee for Peace"] ... and the pro-
posed subject of the forum discussions, impress this court as being of an essentially
controversial nature." Ellis v. Dixon, 118 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (1953).
277 American Civil Liberties Union v. Board of Educ., 28 Cal. Rptr. 700, 379 P.2d
4 (1963) cert. denied, 375 U.S. 823 (1963), distinguishing American Civil Liberties
Union v. Board of Edc., 10 Cal. Rptr. 647, 359 P.2d 45 (1961). The California court
read Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961) to permit prior re-
straints of speech that would be illegal when delivered.
278 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946).
279 While holding in Tucker that "the ... difference.., that here instead of private
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Justice Black, that "the corporation's right to control the inhabitants
of Chickasaw is coextensive with the right of a homeowner to regulate
the conduct of his guests.... Whether a corporation or a municipality
owns or possesses the town the public in either case has an identical
interest in the functioning of the community in such manner that the
channels of communication remain free.""'0 Was it the fact that Ala-
bama had "permitted" a corporation to operate a town,"8 ' or that it
had lent its criminal enforcement to the private landowner's exclusion
of itinerant preachers, which constituted the "state action" required
to invoke the fourteenth amendment? Mr. Justice Black's opinion
clearly implied the former. The question was soon to become crucial
in defining the public sector in which that amendment would establish
constitutional rights.
Two New York decisions a year apart exemplified the problem. In
1948 the New York Court of Appeals unanimously held that the
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, unlike Gulf Shipbuilding's
Chickasaw, could make and enforce regulations barring Jehovah's
Witnesses from the hallways of its 129-acre, 171-building, 35,000 resi-
dent apartment project in the Bronx." 2 That court, however, split four
to three in sustaining the same company's right to exclude negro tenants
from another vast apartment project, built as part of a New York City
redevelopment plan with the aid of tax exemptions and the power of
eminent domain. 8 In each case Mr. Justice Douglas announced that
he would have granted certiorari.284
corporation, the Federal Government owns and operates the village... does not affect
the result," Mr. Justice Black's opinion suggested that national security reasons might
perhaps justify isolating the inhabitants of a federal defense installation from free
access by outsiders. Id. at 520. Presumably such a justification of controlled access
would not be weighed differently whether the community real estate were owned by
the federal government, by a defense or Atomic Energy Commission contractor, or by
individual homeowners incorporated as a conventional town.
280 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506-07. Compare NLRB v. Stowe Spining
Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949), holding that the only public hall in a company town could
not be withheld from a union organizing meeting under the National Labor Relations
Act.
281 326 U.S. at 509.282 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 297 N.MY 339,
79 N.E.2d 433 (1948), distinguishing Marsh v. Alabama on the ground that the pro-
posed distribution of religious literature "was not on streets, sidewalks or other public
or quasi-public places, but inside of, and into, the several floors and inner hallways of
multiple dwellings." 79 N.E2d at 436.283 Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.MY 512, 87 N.E2d 541 (1949).284 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 335 U.S. 886
(1948); Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 339 U.S. 981 (1949), as well as in Hall v.
Virginia, 335 U.S. 875 (1948), decided below in reliance on New York's Watchtower
decision, Hall v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 72, 49 S.E.2d 369 (1948). The Court cited
its dismissal of Hall in sustaining the "Green River ordinance!' against door-to-door
sale of magazine subscriptions in Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
195
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Meanwhile, Shelley v. Kraemer... showed that state court enforce-
ment alone would unconstitutionally involve government in even clearly
"private" landowners' restrictive housing arrangements when exclusion
by race rather than free speech was the issue."' And after the school
desegregation decision in 1954 had held racial segregation itself to be
inherently discriminatory, that holding was at once extended to public
parks, beaches, golf courses, court rooms, and other publicly-owned
community facilities." 7 Once the powers of ownership had been
thought to give government discretion like that of the private home-
owner to exclude the unwanted visitor from its grounds;288 now it was
seen that the more government owned, the more it was responsible for
respecting constitutional rights. Even claims of public order and fear
of violence, sometimes sufficient to override freedom of speech, would
not be balanced against the Negro's right to equal access to public
places.' The open issue became what degree of governmental property
interest, financial support, or regulation would suffice to bring the
segregated territory into the public sector. Thus the fourteenth amend-
ment compelled desegregation of restaurants leasing their premises
from a state-owned parking building.8 and from a municipal airport."'
Mr. Justice Douglas agreed when the Court found government own-
ership to entail compliance with constitutional guarantees. But for him,
ownership was only one criterion of what is "public." When the Court
first reversed "sit-in" convictions in Louisiana on the ground that the
orderly and peaceful presence of Negroes at lunch counters was no
evidence of "disturbing the peace,''. Douglas, unpersuaded by this
limited holdin,g developed his own constitutional view while concurring:
"If these cases had arisen in the Pacific Northwest-the area I know
best-I could agree with the opinion of the Court.... [but in] the
environment of a segregated community I can understand how the mere
285 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
280 For Justice Douglas's readiness to use Shelley v. Kramer against state enforce-
ment of private discrimination in employment on grounds of political views rather than
of race, cf. Black v. Cutter Lab., 351 U.S. 292 (1956), 39 WASH. L. REv. 4, 41 (1964).
287 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Muir v. Louisville Park Theat-
rical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954); Mayor and City Council v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877
(1955) ; Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) ; Park Improvement Ass'n
v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) ; Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) ; Watson v.
City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
288 See text accompanying notes 258, 259 supra.
289 Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963) ; Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S.
526 (1963) ; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) ; compare text accompanying notes
267 to 273 supra.
290 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
291 Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962).
292 Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
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presence of a Negro at a white lunch counter might inflame some
people," he wrote. But though restaurants "are private enterprises,
they are public facilities in which the States may not enforce a policy
of racial segregation.... Restaurants, though a species of private prop-
erty, are in the public domain." 93 He found the reason in a restaurant's
function, for which it is licensed and regulated by the state. "Access
by the public is the very reason for its existence," another Douglas
concurrence argued in 1962.
Business, such as this restaurant, is still private property. Yet there is
hardly any private enterprise that does not feel the pinch of some public
regulation-from price control, to health and fire inspection, to zoning,
to safety measures, to minimum wages and working conditions, and to
unemployment insurance. When the doors of a business are open to
the public, they must be open to all regardless of race if apartheid is not
to become engrained in our public places.29'
He would also hold states to assuring Negro travelers access to public
accommodations, not only as a right entitled to equal protection, but
as an incident of national citizenship.295
Mr. Justice Douglas would recognize that in the modern economy,
favorable government decisions-such as liquor licenses, property
zoning, government guarantees of construction loans, leases or fran-
chises in airports, national forests, or public buildings, contracts to
serve government installations--often represent more important wealth
to entrepreneurs than their own investment in land, brick, or fixtures,
just as he would recognize the property value of Nestor's social security
expectancy. What is "public" and what is "private" property depends
on function more than on title.29 Yet whatever lesser involvement by
government may suffice to invoke the guarantees of the Constitution, a
fortiori they must be observed by government itself as "owner" in man-
aging public property.9 To protect the liberty of Negroes in public
places, the Court has left the theory of Davis v. Massachusetts far be-
293 Id. at 176-83. The majority relied on Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S.
199 (1960). For a critique of the concurring opinion, see Comment, Sit-Ins and Slate
Action--Mr. Justice Douglas, Concurring, 14 STAx. L. REv. 762 (1962).2 94 Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 275-80 (1963).
2905 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 249 (1964). Compare Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941).
298 See Reich, supra note 248.
207 Even in managing "private!' property; see Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 353
U.S. 230 (1957). The State of Georgia has recently been enjoined from racial discrim-
ination in selling or leasing homesites on an island it owns and operates as a state park.
Law v. Jekyll Island State Park Authority, Civil No. 8579, N.D. Ga, July 27, 1964.
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hind, as it left behind the theory of McAuliffe v. New Bedford."8 and
Heim v. McCall."'0 Far from giving government greater discretion, pub-
lic ownership carries into the management of property the constitutional
restraints that bind government generally. In the use of public places,
as in employment and in social benefits, the principle appears most
evident when it strikes at racial discrimination. But though the equal
protection clause may be the most obvious of constitutional limitations,
it has no unique status that would make it the only such restraint.
Against the federal government, freedom from racial discrimination
itself must be subsumed under the more general "liberty" which, by
the fifth amendment, may not be denied without due process of law."'0
Liberty also includes observance of other constitutional restraints, as
the welfare state brings more and more important categories of real
estate-public housing, hospitals, schools and colleges, parks, military
and civilian installations, and the federal lands-into the public sector.
Doubtless Mr. Justice Douglas would not apply his dictum that
"[T]he power of Congress over public lands... is 'without limita-
tions' " to meet a claim based on one of the specific guarantees of the
Bill of Rights.3 ' For it is on public property that much of modern life
is lived. Could a state, as landlord of college dormitories, deny a stu-
dent's freedom from search and seizure, or make him waive it as a
condition of admission?0 2 Can public schools systematically open and
search students' lockers for pilfered property, if police could not do
the same in a private school? Where does the hospitalized veteran have
freedom of speech, unless he can mount his soapbox somewhere on the
grounds of the veterans' hospital to harangue his fellows on the iniquity
of the Veterans Administration? The proper constitutional test of rea-
sons for restricting his speech (or an ensuing parade) there is whether
the same reasons would or would not sustain, over first amendment
298 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). See 39 WASH. L. REV. 31-32 (1964).
29239 U.S. 33 (1915).
200 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
301 FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 21 (1952) ; see 39 WASH. L. REv. 4, 18
(1964). Permission for the Idaho Power Co. to build transmission lines across public
land could be conditioned on carrying Bonneville power over those lines. Could similar
permission for Western Union be conditioned on not carrying "indecent" or "subver-
sive" transmissions disfavored by Congress? Compare Douglas's view of the postal
power, Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946), note 174 supra.
502 Cf., with respect to the residents of the state's jails, Lanza v. New York, 370
U.S. 139 (1962). Mr. Justice Douglas believes the fourth amendment protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures for other governmental objectives than criminal
prosecutions; see his dissents in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 374 (1959) (health
inpection of home), Abel v. United States, 217, 241 (1960) (deportation); thus its
standards would govern searches that led only to eviction from a public housing unit
or a college dormitory.
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objections, the same government restriction of speeches or parades at
private hospitals. We have seen that it was the right, not only to equal
protection, but to free speech itself that opened the public streets to
such dissemination of ideas and opinions. The limits of this right de-
rive solely from the needs of traffic and public peace and order, irre-
spective of discrimination or arbitrary discretion, whether the agitators
are union organizers, Jehovah's Witnesses, or Negro freedom march-
ers. 3' Why should the principle not be the same for all government
real estate, for parks and beaches, for public housing projects and col-
lege campuses, though the limits derived from their distinctive charac-
teristics, functions, and necessary conditions of use might differ?3"4 Mr.
Justice Holmes himself would probably find only the same, and no
greater, reason why the most stringent protection of free speech would
not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a publicly-owned as in a
private theatre. If the auditorium rented for Terminiello's Chicago
03 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) ; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,
235 (1963), recognizing a peaceful protest rally at the site of state government as "an
exercise of these basic constitutional rights [of speech, assembly, and petition] in their
most pristine and classic form" and distinguishing Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315
(1951), on the absence of threatened violence; Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 375 U.S. 6
(1963) ; Fields v. South Carolina, 375 U.S. 44 (1963).
304 To avoid misunderstanding: The present point is that, against an objection under
the first, fourth, or fourteenth amendments, the validity of a governmental restraint in
a publicly-owned place depends on whether government could, under the same condi-
tions, and over the same objection, validly impose the same restraint in a similar
privately-owned place. It leaves aside claims against land-use controls based on the
private owner's property rights under the due process and just compensation clauses;
government does have greater discretion in the public sector than in the private to
the extent that it may not unconstitutionally impose economic loss on the private owner.
Compare note 180 supra, and 39 WAsH. L. Rav. 4, 11-13 (1964). A noisy political
campaign song might constitutionally be silenced on the sidewalk in front of a hospital
-or if it moves to a private lot across the street. Even a civil rights parade might
be fined for trampling flower beds in a public park-or in a private park. If the United
States Forest Service can exclude billboards from national forest roads even when
Foster & Kleiser substitutes appeals to attend church for the usual advertisements of
gasoline or toilet tissue, it must be because the first amendment would not preclude
billboard control on privately-owned roadsides. Conversely, a government cannot
refuse the use of a publicly-owned hall if (apart from any issue of the owner's property
rights) its closing of an identical privately-owned hall to the same use under the same
circumstances would violate freedom of speech or assembly; thus, valid reasons must
be of a kind (safety, reasonable hours, adequate staffing) that permit government
regulation of private theatres, school rooms, or other places of public assembly. In
this view, the California Supreme Court was right and the New York court wrong
about a school board's duty, under the first amendment and quite apart from discrim-
inatory administration, not to refuse the public use of a school auditorium except for
reasons that would equally support government restraints on the use of a private
school auditorium. See notes 274-77 supra.
This is a different issue from whether the private landowner may impose additional
restrictions forbidden to government, or whether the law may permit and aid him to
do so, discussed supra at notes 278-95; but in a logical extension of Mr. Justice
Douglas's realism about what is "public' and what is "private," the constitutional
rules for both issues would merge. Cf. his opinions in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S.
157 (1961) ; Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963) ; and Black v. Cutter Lab.,
351 U.S. 292 (1956).
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appearance had belonged to the city rather than a private landowner,
could he have been evicted, even though he could not be convicted,
by the standards which Mr. Justice Douglas found inconsistent with
the first amendment?"'5 Not long ago the University of Oregon was
the object of much unsought publicity when it let the Communist
spokesman Gus Hall speak to students on the campus. Could the Uni-
versity exclude him from the campus unless its reasons would equally
justify the state from prohibiting his appearance on any college cam-
pus ?306
Establishment Revisited. There remains, in examining such a prin-
ciple for public places, the question to what extent it is limited by the
first amendment's proscription against an establishment of religion.
That question, which has proved so difficult with respect to public
education and other social benefits and services of the welfare state," 7
has not so far caused comparable difficulties with respect to the use of
public real estate.
From Lovell and Cantwell to Kunz, Niemotko, Fowler, and Poulos,
Jehovah's Witnesses and an occasional other street preacher have suc-
cessfully insisted on a right to proselytize in the public streets and
parks which, if no greater, at least has not been held to be less than
that of various secular prophets." When Saia v. New York3.. per-
mitted one such missionary to use a sound truck to broadcast his
message into a public park, Mr. Justice Jackson once raised in dissent
the establishment issue that had just been decided in McCollum v.
Board of Education,1 ' the first released-time case: "Only a few weeks
ago we held that the Constitution prohibits a state or municipality from
using tax-supported property 'to aid religious groups to spread their
faith.'... Today we say it compels them to let it be used for that pur-
305 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) ("breach of the peace" defined to
include speech stirring public anger, dispute, unrest, or a disturbance.)
306 Hall was invited by students; the question is not one of university sponsorship
but only of access to the university's grounds and structures. Advance attacks caused
increasing interest until Hall's appearance, originally scheduled for a moderately-
sized room, filled the football stadium, where it took its course in peace and good
order. Eugene Register-Guard, Feb. 13, 1962, p. 1. Other campuses of the Oregon
state system of higher education split on permitting Hall to appear. Recently the
University of Washington and the University of California have acted to modernize
their rules concerning speakers on campus. See generally Van Alstyne, Political
Speakers at State Universities: Some Constitutiontal Considerations, 111 U. PA L. REv.
328 (1963) ; Pollitt, Campus Censorship: Barring Speakers From State Educational
Institutions, 42 N.C. L. REv. 179 (1963).
307 See text accompanying notes 200-241 supra.
308 See text accompanying notes 261-73 supra and KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW
ch. 6 (1962).
809 334 U.S. 558 (1948). 310 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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pose. In the one case the public property was appropriated to school
uses; today it is public property appropriated and equipped for recrea-
tional purposes." ' But his attack was directed at the Court's protec-
tion of loudspeakers in general, not at letting religion share with secular
speech the platform of the public grounds. And since the licensing
ordinance on its face placed uncontrolled discretion in the chief of
police, Mr. Justice Douglas, for the majority, held it void as a previous
restraint on any kind of expression protected by the first amendment.
Would the question of "establishment" remain quiescent though the
public property involved were buildings, or though it were given to a
more frequent and regular religious use than a sporadic street parade
or prayer meeting in a park? Would the government that obeys the
first amendment when it permits a Communist to speak in its public
auditorium, violate the first amendment if it lent the same auditorium
to an evangelist's rally-or if it refused to lend it? Is the Eugene
school board wrong to rent its school buildings to congregations for
regular Sunday services pending construction of their own churches?
In McCollum, Mr. Justice Black had indeed found the use of public
school buildings for religious purposes to fall under the ban against
financial "establishment" which the free bus rides in Everson v. Board
of Education81 2 had so closely escaped, and Mr. Justice Douglas in
Zorach v. Clauson, had duly noted the adsence of such use in sustaining
an otherwise comparable released time program. But in both opinions
the context suggests that it was the reality of the public school as a com-
munity institution that gave substance to the references concerning the
community's investment in bricks and chairs.3 8 The public school
uniquely represents the community to children. To permit the use of
the school house for adult assemblies, without regard to their religious
or secular subject matter, is not the same as, for instance, to make it
the site of a regularly scheduled Sunday school.
811 334 U.S. at 569.
312330 U.S. 1 (1947).
313 Black had coupled "the use of tax-supported property for religious instruction
and the close cooperation between the school authorities and the religious council;"
the vice was that "not only are the State's tax-supported public school buildings used
for the dissemination of religious doctrines. The State also affords sectarian groups
an invaluable aid in that it helps to provide pupils for their religious classes through
use of the State's compulsory public school machinery." McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203, 209, 212 (1948). Douglas recited it as a single distinction in Zorach:
"In the McCollum case the classrooms were used for religious instruction and the
force of the public school was used to promote that instruction." 343 U.S. at 315 (1952).
Black, dissenting, saw no difference between the systems "except for the use of
the school buildings," and invoked the last quoted passage from his McCollum opinion
to show that this was not the important factor. 343 U.S. at 316.
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Public ownership cannot alone decide the issue between "establish-
ment" and "free exercise" of religion, when tested against the hypoth-
esis that the community may own all the relevant real estate. The
establishment clause would seem to mean, at least, that government
may not build a church. Yet, may government in fact refuse to furnish
a building for church services where it has a monopoly of all buildings
or where people are precluded from leaving them, as in military camps
or in state institutions?"'4 Freedom of religion does not give churches
immunity from the zoning of private land uses, 1 but zoning that left
no room for a church anywhere in the community would surely raise
a different question. The first amendment should leave the state, as
landowner, as much but no greater power to exclude churches than
as government."1 Thus, the federally-owned village which, according
to Tucker v. Texas.17 could not deny Jehovah's Witnesses the use of
its streets to preach at the doors of its government-owned houses, pre-
sumably could not deny the use of some suitable government-owned
building for the indoor worship of a more conventional denomination.
"The question is not what government must give, but rather what it
may not take away.....
While the use of public buildings for religious purposes may involve
interests of real substance, however, as a stimulant of civic controversy
over "establishment" it cannot match the placing of religious symbols
on public grounds. The year's hottest public debate in Eugene, Oregon,
arose from some private volunteers' construction of a large cross in
a hillside public park visible for miles; a more widely recurring form
of this issue was compromised by a decision to move the next Christmas
314 Mr. Justice Reed, the sole dissenter in McCollum, argued that even less than a
monopoly of land made use of public buildings for religious instruction reasonable and
cited the precedent of chapels at the service academies: "Metropolitan centers like
New York usually would have available quarters convenient to the schools. Unless
smaller cities and rural communities use the school building at times that do not
interfere with recitations, they may be compelled to give up religious education....
When actual church services have always been permitted on government property,
the mere use of the school buildings by a non-sectarian group for religious education
ought not to be condemned as an establishment of religion." 333 U.S. at 252, 255.
315 The Court dismissed such a claim for want of substantial federal question,
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Porterville, 338 U.S. 805 (1949).
316 In Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), Mr. Justice Douglas had treated
regulation and taking for public use or for resale as equivalent tools of government.
See 39 WAsH. L. REv. 4, 11-13 (1964). He voted to grant certiorari when New York
sold to Fordham University, a Catholic institution, land which the city had condemned
for the Lincoln Square urban renewal project, perhaps in order to examine whether
a financial subsidy was involved. Harris v. City of New York, 357 U.S. 907 (1958).317 326 U.S. 517 (1946).
318 Mr. Justice Douglas in Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954), see 39
NWAsH. L. REv. 4, 40 (1964).
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display from the courthouse square to adjoining private land. In such
matters, can government turn to first amendment doctrine to find a
rule for liberty in public places?
When Mr. Justice Douglas reconsidered the question of "establish-
ment" in the Regents' Prayer case, his concurring opinion returned
to stressing the use of public funds and property. McCollum was not
decisive, he wrote, since it involved religious exposition and indoctrina-
tion as well as the use of public school facilities; but he would not find
such proselytizing in Engel. New York had overstepped the constitu-
tional bounds specifically by financing a religious exercise." 9 Among
the widespread examples of such public financing, Douglas cited com-
munity Christmas trees decorated with Biblical mottos. But the Jus-
tice's opinions in Engel and later in Schempp still leave inexplicit
whether he would hold the use of publicly-owned real property alone
to constitute forbidden support for religion. The references are to
operating public "facilities" and "institutions" rather than to property
as such; the hypothetical community Christmas tree is described as
"purchased with the taxpayers' money." 2 ' There is no retreat from
the earlier decision that the first amendment also secures religious
speech and assembly on public grounds. But how much besides public
property will make an establishment?
There is reason to require something other than the mere use of
government-owned land or structures, for the historic or economic ac-
cidents of public or private title may not close the physical environment
to the free exercise of religion. Cost is not the distinction. The use
of a public hall, a park, a national forest campground, has an economic
cost and value as surely as the services of the chaplain or teacher
leading a prayer. The fraction of the teacher's time so spent seems
minuscule, wrote Mr. Justice Douglas in Engel, yet "the principle is
the same, [for] the person praying is a public official on the public
payroll, performing a religious exercise in a government institution. 8 21
And in Schempp he again found that "public funds, though small in
amount, are being used to promote a religious exercise.... Such contri-
butions may not be made by the State even in a minor degree without
violating the Establishment Clause. It is not the amount of public
funds expended; as this case illustrates, it is the use to which public
funds are put that is controlling. 3 22
819 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 439 (1962).
820 Id. at 441-42, 374 U.S. at 229.
S21 370 U.S. at 441 822 374 U.S. at 229-30.
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If the use to which public funds are put is to "perform" or to "pro-
mote" a religious exercise, the use of funds suffices to constitute an
establishment. Yet it will not matter that private groups donate the re-
ligious display for a public park. Government financing is a sufficient,
but not an indispensable, criterion of establishment. The "something
more" than the use of public grounds need not cost additional public
funds, it may be the appearance of government sponsorship, just as
the school prayers in Engel would not be saved if the school brought
in unpaid volunteers instead of paid teachers to lead the daily classroom
exercise. Whether government property becomes the scene of an estab-
lishment of religion or of its free exercise, absent other government
financing, must thus depend on such variable as time, place, and dura-
tion. On the one hand, few would argue that a state could erect even
donated crucifixes in its courthouses; on the other, we have seen that
religious meetings cannot be excluded from otherwise suitable public
parks. In the range between there is much room both for prescribed
governmental neutrality and proscribed governmental endorsement. In
a city park or on a state college campus, a speaker or a passing proces-
sion should not, a week-long display perhaps might, and a permanent
religious symbol surely will carry the implication of government spon-
sorship. But no such implication may appear if a congregation decor-
ates a rented public hall for even a prolonged holiday celebration, or
another constructs a simple chapel on a forest campsite leased for a
religious retreat. Publicly-owned or not, these will be plainly under-
stood to be private places for the duration of such use.
Two factors other than ownership of a place emerge to determine
what is public and what is private, for purposes of liberty in the public
sector. One is the function of the place. The other is who makes the
challenged choice. Ownership, if private, is relevant to the owner's
additional constitutional guarantees of property rather than liberty;
if public, it is evidence of governmental support and involvement. But
ownership is not conclusive.
A private landowner may be performing such essential community
functions that the law, to remain constitutional, must hold him to
constitutional standards. Even beyond the case of a company town,
Mr. Justice Douglas would not let government abdicate to private
owners its responsibility for liberty in public places. On the other hand,
government cannot impose demands forbidden by the Bill of Rights
on places whose function is private, even if it owns them. The gov-
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ernment's tenant in the public housing project, at the forest ranger
station, in the university's married students' apartment, remains as
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, as free to place a
crucifix on his wall or to remove it, as free to close his door to a Negro
or to a Jehovah's Witness, as his neighbor on private land. The choices
are his. "The problem with which we deal has no relation to opening
or closing the door of one's home," Douglas wrote in the restaurant
sit-in cases. "The home is the essence of privacy, in no way dedicated
to public use, in no way extending an invitation to the public."82
VIII. "BALK IZING" THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Most issues of constitutional rights in the public sector have arisen
from claims of political and religious freedom, equal treatment, and
procedural fairness under the fourteenth amendment and the Bill of
Rights. But these are not the only constitutional limitations on govern-
ment's freedom of action. Already the Articles of Confederation had
pledged the states to accord one another's inhabitants freedom of
travel, trade and commerce, and "all privileges and immunities of free
citizens in the several States."8' 24 One of the essential purposes and
achievements of the Constitution, designed by a convention seeking to
remedy the demonstrated defects of the Articles, was to impose further
restraints on the self-serving parochialism of states in the interest of a
national financial and commercial market, both for domestic and for
foreign trade."5 Do these restraints govern the states as growing social
services and other governmental programs bring more and more eco-
nomic activity into the public sector?
The conflict between state economic protectionism and the constitu-
tional vision of a common, national economic fate was intensified by
the shrinking economy of the Great Depression. By the end of the
1930's, the states' efforts to help local business at the expense of their
neighbors had become a subject for wide public and academic con-
323 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 253 (1964).
32 4 ART. CoNFrD., art. IV. The lengthy first section of this article was compressed
into the first clause of U.S. CoxsT., art. IV, § 2: "The Citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
325 U.S. COST., art. I, §§ 8, 10; Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419
(1827). Section 10 expressly denies state power over money and over import or export
duties, both assigned to Congress in section 8; without any express denial, the grant of
power to Congress "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States" has been held to imply substantial limits on state interference with such com-
merce.
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cern"' Interstate trade barriers were examined by the Temporary
National Economic Committee. 2 ' As Mr. Justice Douglas took his seat
on the Supreme Court, a National Conference on Interstate Trade Bar-
riers called by the Council of State Governments was convening in
Chicago.328 Among the protectionist barriers identified in these studies
were the restrictive practices of governmental contracting for goods
and services. Whatever the special legal position of these practices, to
the economist they were relatively minor variants of much broader
state incursions into the market mechanisms of the national econ-
omy.
329
Although state protectionism was generally deplored, the proper role
of the Supreme Court as the watchdog of economic nationalism was
itself in controversy. The justices who in 1937 unshackled federal
power over the national economy were generally sympathetic rather
than hostile to state programs.3 Mr. Justice Stone had led the way
from a doctrinaire towards an empirical approach in applying the
commerce clause to control state regulation and taxation. 3 ' But the
survivors of the old school had misgivings,332 while Mr. Justice Black,
the first Roosevelt appointee, doubted any judicial competence to apply
controls under the commerce clause and dissented when Stone's method
326 See, e.g., Melder, State and Local Barriers to Interstate Coumerce in the United
States, 40 THE MAINE BULLETINS, No. 4 (UNIv. OF MAINE STUDIES, 2d Sec., No. 43)
(1937); Buell, Death by Tariff, FORTUNE, Aug. 1938, p. 32; Symposium on Cooperative
Federalism, 23 IOwA L. REv. 455 (1938) ; DeCourcy, State Trade Barriers to Inter-
state Commerce, 2 COMPARATIVE L. SERIES (1939) ; Comment, State Economic Protec-
tionism and the Federal Constitution, 34 ILL. L. REv. 44 (1939) ; Tocker, Trade Bar-
riers, 18 TEXAS L. REv. 274 (1940) ; Symposium, Interstate Trade Barriers, 16 IND.
L.J. 121 (1940) ; Symposium, Governmental Marketing Barriers, 8 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 207 (1941); Symposium, 9 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 755 (1941).
327 Hearings Before the Temporary National Economic Committee, 76th Cong., 2d
Sess., § 29 at 15735 (1941).
328 See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS., PROC. NAT. CONF. ON INTERSTATE TRADE BAR-
RIERS (1939).
329 See Melder, supra note 326, ch. 2. Corwin D. Edwards argued that govern-
mental regulations, enacted in response to the economic interests which benefit from
them, should be seen as part of a range of public and private devices to restrain competi-
tion ("those which depend partly upon the machinery of public laws and those whose
machinery is entirely private. . . . are used interchangeably to accomplish the same
private end"). As an example Edwards cites the efforts of lumber manufacturers'
associations to have association grademarking required in Federal purchasing, F.H.A.
loan, and local building code standards. Edwards, Trade Barriers Created by Business,
16 INn. L.J. 169, 171-74 (1940).
330 See 39 WASH. L.REv. 4-9 (1964).
331 South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938);
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Rev., 303 U.S. 250 (1938) ; and for his inclusion of a
political calculus, see 39 WASH. L. REV. 4, 24 n.86 (1964).33 2 Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Rev., supra note 331, at 261 (McReynolds and
Butler, dissenting); Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 316 (1938) (Mc-
Reynolds, dissenting); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 441
(1939) (Butler and McReynolds, concurring).
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led to invalidating a state tax or law.3 The learning of a century of
decisions conveyed neither uniformity of results nor clarity of reason-
ing. In this as in other constitutional fields, a new judge might work
his way through old choices afresh.
During his early years on the Court, Mr. Justice Douglas shared
Black's reluctance to interfere with state economic policies unless they
discriminated against, rather than merely burdened, interstate com-
merce. By its terms, the commerce clause assigned the task of protect-
ing the national economy to Congress, not to the Court, and Congress
had been busy using the powers which the Court had newly confirmed
to it. When a majority enjoined as a burden on interstate commerce an
Arkansas tax on gasoline in the tanks of interstate buses beyond that
which would be burned within the state, Justices Douglas and Frank-
furter, in their first year, wrote in joint dissent with Mr. Justice Black:
This case again illustrates the wisdom of the Founders in placing inter-
state commerce under the protection of Congress....
Our disagreement with the opinions just announced does not arise from
a belief that federal action is unnecessary to bring about appropriate uni-
formity in regulations of interstate commerce .... 334
Judicial control of national commerce-unlike legislative regulations-
must from inherent limitations of the judicial process treat the subject by
the hit-and-miss method of deciding single local controversies upon evi-
dence and information limited by the narrow rules of litigation. Spas-
modic and unrelated instances of litigation cannot afford an adequate basis
for the creation of integrated national rules which alone can afford that
full protection for interstate commerce intended by the Constitution. We
would, therefore, leave the questions raised by the Arkansas tax for con-
sideration of Congress in a nation-wide survey of the constantly increas-
ing barriers to trade among the States.335
Douglas reaffirmed these views in a 1945 dissent when a Stone opinion
found Arizona's restrictions on the length of trains not supported by
any sufficient local need,3 ' and again in a 1946 tax case."' But in that
333 Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, supra note 332; Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henne
ford, supra note 332; Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 784 (1945). In Barn-
well Bros., Black had caused Stone to remove from his draft opinion a reference to
South Carolina's highway regulations as "reasonable" that might be construed to imply
a judicial evaluation of the kind to which Stone returned, over Black's dissent, in
Southern Pac. MASON, HARLAx Fisx SToNE: PlI.LA OF THE LAW 492.
334 McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176, 185 (1940).
335 Id. at 188-89. The opinion cited the 1939 W. P.A. and Council of State Govern-
ment studieg of interstate trade barriers. Another of the dissenters was to move
toward greater judicial intervention under the commerce clause; see Brown, The Open
Econwmy: Justice Frankfurter and the Positilo of the Judiciary, 67 YALE LJ. 219
(1957).
56 Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 795 (1945).33 7 Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 435 (1946).
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year he joined the majority rather than Black's unrepentant concur-
rence in using the commerce clause to strike down state-enforced segre-
gation on interstate buses." 8 By 1949, Douglas had moved into the
nationalist camp, making a fifth vote for Mr. Justice Jackson's strong-
est statement of the "common market" philosophy in H. P. Hood &
Sons v. Du Mond339 over the protests of Black, Frankfurter, Rutledge
and Murphy. Thereafter, his votes have continued to reflect a commit-
ment to that philosophy toward state regulation in the economy, espe-
cially if Congress appears to have declared a national policy. 4
Meanwhile, the prevailing commerce clause doctrine has contented
itself with reaffirming the concurrent power of local regulation where it
does not "discriminate" against interstate commerce, or "disrupt its
required uniformity," or "unduly burden" it, while protecting "a legiti-
mate local public interest," aided by references to the "traditional con-
cept of what is compendiously known as the police power" that imply
a distinction between the states' concern for their economies and for
the "health, life, and safety of their citizens.".... With the increasing
probability that the objects of state regulation are also reached by
federal laws, the decisive debate now often shifts to the issue of fed-
338 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946). Soon thereafter Douglas, in an opinion
for the Court under Article I, § 10, cited Southern Pacific and Morgan for the "well
established" doctrine "that the Commerce Clause is a limitation upon the power of the
States, even in the absence of action by Congress ;" Richfield Oil Corp. vs. State Bd.,
329 U.S. 69, 75 (1946). For his view of the stricter restraints imposed on state taxes
by the export-import clause, see also Joseph v. Carter & Weeks Co., 330 U.S. 422, 434
(1947) (dissent).
339 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
340 California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 741 (1949) (dissent against state regulation of
travel agents' sale of interstate transportation) ; Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v. Michigan
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 U.S. 329, 337 (1951) (dissent against state certificate for inter-
state sales of natural gas) ; Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 645 (1951) (dissent
against "Green River" ordinance applied to magazine solicitation) ; Buck v. California,
343 U.S. 99, 104 (1952) (dissent against local permit for taxicabs in foreign com-
merce) ; Fry Roofing Co. v. Wood, 344 U.S. 157, 163 (1952) (dissent against state
certification of interstate truckers) ; Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520
(1959) (majority opinion invalidating state mudguard requirements for interstate
trucks) ; Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 449 (1960) (dis-
sent against smoke ordinance applied to ship boilers licensed by U.S. Coast Guard) ;
and see Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs, Inc. 366 U.S. 276, 288 (1961) (dissent
against state licensing to conduct interstate business) ; Florida Lime & Avocado Grow-
ers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 159 (1963) (dissent against state standards for avocados
also governed by federal standards). An early exception is Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 357 (1951) (dissent in support of local restrictions on inspection
of milk supply). Douglas has continued to support state taxation against extension of
commerce clause restraints.
34' Huron Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442-43 (1960) ; Head v. New
Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424, 428-29 (1963). Mr. Justice Stewart's recent
references to "police power" in these recitals of accumulated commerce clause terminol-
ogy revert to an effort to distinguish valid local "police laws" from invalid "regulations
of commerce" that is at least as old as Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Peters)
102 (1837) and the License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
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eral preemption. 42 The rule that the commerce clause by itself ex-
cludes local economic protectionism no longer calls forth extensive
theoretical discussion. 343 Thus, state regulation of "local" activities
may have valid purposes to be "weighed" against the adverse effect on
interstate commerce, but no such analysis and balancing of relative
values is undertaken where this adverse effect is itself patently the
purpose of the regulation.
Obviously these distinctions continue to pose difficult issues in appli-
cation. But, however they may apply to concrete cases, is their applica-
tion the same in the public sector? Or may the state as seller and buyer
choose to impose on the national economy burdens of trade barriers
and artificial resource allocations that it could not impose through reg-
ulation of private sellers and buyers? Can state government invoke an
independent proprietary interest that, apart from other valid purposes,
immunizes even patent economic protectionism and discrimination
against interstate commerce from constitutional attack?
In fact, state and local governments do assume such unrestrained
proprietary powers to discriminate against the national economy in
favor of the local economy. In 1960 all states but one had official pur-
chasing preference rules giving absolute or percentage preferences to
local products, suppliers, or labor.'" Taken individually, many of
these acts of discrimination may not appear as significant burdens on
the national interest favoring free commerce among the states. But the
total of state and local purchases is too large a sector of the economy,
and too likely to grow further, for such an assumption to remain un-
examined as a principle of constitutional law. In 1962 state and local
operating expenditures for supplies, materials, and services (other than
salaries of public employees) was about $14 billion, and capital outlay
$16.7 billion.4 5 In many specific fields, of course, public purchases
constitute a much larger proportion of the relevant market. Public
school systems in New York, Los Angeles, or Chicago that may buy
books for hundreds of thousands of children each year dwarf any com-
parable private market; for chalk, blackboards, school desks, and the
3 42 Huron Cement Co. v. City of Detroit 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (Coast Guard license);
Florida Lime & Avacado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) Dep't of Agric.
reg.) ; see Note, 12 STAN. L. Ray. 208 (1965).
343 Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964) (preference
for in-state producers in local milk market unanimously invalidated.)3 4 The various state policies are compiled in Lueck, State Purchasing Preference
Practices, BuREAu oF EcoN. Am Busim-ss RESEARCH, U. oF UTAH (1961). Wisconsin
alone was reported to be pure. See also Melder, supra note 326.
-45 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances in 1962 (Oct. 1963).
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like, public education is effectively the total market. A state law that
would require all business offices to purchase only pencils manufac-
tured in the state would fall at once under the commerce clause; un-
deniably, a similar order to all schools and public offices equally dis-
criminates against and burdens interstate commerce.
Nevertheless, the constitutional immunity of economic protectionism
by the state as buyer has been taken for granted by the critics of state
barriers to interstate trade, a judgment based on the same decisions,
Heim v. McCall4 ' and Crane v. New York," 7 which were once thought
to support unreviewable discretion over government employment.348
But that reliance is misplaced.
In the decisions in the New York Court of Appeals that were later
affirmed in these cases, Judge Cardozo had defended the discretion of
the state to consider the welfare of its own citizens in spending public
funds to the extent of excluding aliens from employment on public
works. But the attack had been under the fourteenth amendment, and
even in this respect the opinion had warned that discretion would not
extend to discriminatory disqualifications among classes of the state's
citizens.34 Judge Cardozo, like Mr. Justice Douglas after him,350 knew
that state policies valid under the fourteenth amendment might not
survive conflict with the commerce clause. New York's milk price con-
trol law had been held not to take the industry's liberty or property
without due process; "I thereafter, the state argued that the protection
of New York's milk supply which supported this result also justified it
in excluding Vermont milk unless the New York price was paid to the
out-of-state producer. "Such a power," wrote Mr. Justice Cardozo for
a unanimous Court in Baldwin v. Seelig,352 "will set a barrier to traffic
between one state and another as effective as if customs duties, equal to
the price differential, had been laid upon the thing transported.) 353
Nice distinctions have been made at times between direct and indirect
burdens. They are irrelevant when the avowed purpose of the obstruc-
tion, as well as its necessary tendency, is to suppress or mitigate the
346 239 U.S. 175 (1915).
347239 U.S. 195 (1915).
848 See also Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903) ; McAllister, Court, Congress and
Trade Barriers, 16 IND. L.J. 144, 164 (1940) ; Note, 16 IND. L.J. 269 (1949) ; Peck,
State Provincialism and the Proprietary Power, 20 NEB. L. RFv. 149, 151-52 (1941) ;
Melder supra note 326, at 34-36; all predating the inroads on Heim made by and after
the Hatch Act opinions. See 39 WASH. L. Ray. 4, 31-46.
349 People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427 (1915) ; Heim v. McCall, 214 N.Y
629, 108 N.E. 1095 (1915).
350 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
351 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
352 294 U.S. 511 (1935). 358 Id. at 521.
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consequences of competition between the states.... If New York, in order
to promote the economic welfare of her farmers, may guard them against
competition with the cheaper prices of Vermont, the door has been opened
to rivalries and reprisals that were meant to be averted by subjecting
commerce between the states to the power of the nation. 54
Trade barriers economic in form would not be saved by a claim that the
ultimate objective was local health rather than wealth.
Economic welfare is always related to health, for there can be no health if
men are starving. Let such an exception be admitted, and all that a state
will have to do in times of stress and strain is to say that its farmers and
merchants and workmen must be protected against competition from
without, lest they go upon the poor relief lists or perish altogether. To
give entrance to that excuse would be to invite a speedy end of our na-
tional solidarity. The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a
political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the
theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together,
and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not
division.3 5'
Cardozo's statement of the free trade doctrine, quoted extensively in
Hood & Sons, 8' was unanimously reaffirmed in 1964, when the Court
struck down a Florida scheme to give Florida dairy farmers a statutory
priority over out-of-state producers in supplying milk for distribution
in the state."'7 From the constitutional perspective of the commerce
clause that compelled this result, it seems immaterial whether milk dis-
tribution was in the public or the private sector. Why should it matter
to that perspective if Florida farmers were to persuade the state gov-
ernment to take over milk distribution as a public function? 58 Nothing
in the opinions of the author of People v. Crane5' and Baldwin v.
Seelig.6 suggests that this should change a result under the commerce
clause. Yet if it does not, can Florida limit its milk purchases for a
public school lunch program or other public institutions to Florida
producers?
354 Id. at 522.
55 Id. at 523.
356 336 U.S. 525, 532 (1941).
357 Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964).358 With respect to the analogous marketing of liquor through state stores, the 21st
amendment deflects what might otherwise be the impact of the commerce clause on
public economic activity. Cf. State Bd. v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936);
Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964). It was this dis-
tinction that proved decisive for the State of Washington, when California sued it for
discriminating against out-of-state wines, California v. Washington, 358 U.S. 64 (1958).
859 214 N.Y 154, 108 N.E. 427 (1915).
360 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
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In other commerce clause cases, no consistent significance has been
given the question whether the state's pursuit of its local interest oc-
curred in the public or the private sector. When state-authorized
bridges were attacked as obstructions to interstate commerce, the Court
did not ask whether they were built by private licensees or by the gov-
ernment itself."' In sustaining truck width and weight restrictions
against similar attack, Mr. Justice Stone in South Carolina State High-
way Department v. Barnwell Brothers.6 referred to many decisions
that rested the validity of traffic regulations in part on the state's own-
ership of "its" highways. But he coupled the state's interest in conserv-
ing its investment with its interest in local safety that would be an
independent ground of validity irrespective of ownership. And even
public economic investment and legal title would not permit a state,
under the guise of regulation, to discriminate against interstate com-
merce.3"3 Safety would presumably support regulation of interstate
traffic even on the roads of a private turnpike corporation, or on pri-
vately-built logging roads. On the other hand, perhaps it is doubtful
whether Barnwell Brothers itself would apply today to the Interstate
and Defense highway system, built to safety and engineering standards
of the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads and financed with over 90 percent
federal funds, even though construction, ownership, and maintenance
remain state functions. In 1945, the case for safety was insufficiently
proved for Arizona's train-length law to survive commerce clause at-
tack. 6' Stone quoted Barnwell Brothers to distinguish it: "Unlike the
railroads, local highways are built, owned and maintained by the state
or it municipal subdivisions. The state is responsible for their safe and
economical administration. ... 6" But would the same train-length law
have been immune from the stated test of weighing the local interest
against "the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from
361 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. 54 U.S.(13 How.)518 (1852);
Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1866). In Kansas Southern Ry.
Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage Dist., 233 U.S. 75 (1913), invalidating under the
commerce clause a state order to remove a railroad bridge, Mr. Justice Holmes wrote:
"The freedom from interference on the part of the States is not confined to a simple
prohibition of laws impairing it, but extends to interference by any ultimate organ."
Would the controlling commerce clause reasons be less compelling in a suit to restrain
the state from removing a state-owned railroad bridge?
362 South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187-89
(1938).
363 Id. at 189. Both the "ownership" and "safety" interests of the state in its high-
ways could, of course, be superseded by federal law, though this result will not readily
be implied. See Welch v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79 (1939). But the commerce
clause alone can be sufficient. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
364 Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
365 Id. at 783, quoting 303 U.S. 177, 187 (1938).
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interferences which seriously impede it"' 88 if a public state agency
rather than a private corporation owned the transcontinental roadbed
and rails in Arizona? "California, by engaging in interstate commerce
by rail, has subjected itself to the commerce power," Mr. Justice Stone
had also written in 1936; the commerce clause leaves state-owned
functions in no stronger position than state-regulated private ones when
Congress has acted under it."'7 In 1959, Mr. Justice Douglas wrote for
the Court that the Southern Pacific "national interest" test of the com-
merce clause alone, without Congressional action, also reaches state-
owned highways, when a state pursues safety by restrictions on equip-
ment inconsistent with movement from or into other states. The state's
ownership of the roads is evidently too plainly irrelevant to the com-
merce clause issue to be discussed. "Like any local law that conflicts
with federal regulatory measures.., state regulations that run afoul of
the policy of free trade reflected in the Commerce Clause must also
bow.))3 s
In the many conflicts between state economic protectionism and the
nationalism of the commerce clause and article IV, the Supreme Court
has come closest to dealing with distinctions of the public and private
sectors when states have sought to capitalize on local natural resources.
The resource cases, and the role of a "title" theory in sustaining state
power, have often received extensive analysis.8 ' Early opinions re-
ferred to the state's "ownership" of wild animals to support fish and
game laws against a variety of constitutional attacks. This historical
fiction was never extended to other kinds of environmental resources
and was soon replaced by a conventional "police power" analysis of the
local interest in conservation. For the third time in this narrative, the
story of the search for clarity about the constitutional choice (though
making the wrong choice) begins with Mr. Justice Holmes.7 0 When
New Jersey prohibited riparian owners from exporting water from
366 Id. at 776.
307 United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 185 (1936); California v. United
States, 320 U.S. 577 (1944), California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957); cf. 39 WAsn.
L. Rav. 4,27 (1964).
388 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959), quoting also the
Southern Pacific test, at 524.
369 Hardman, The Right of a State to Restrain the Exportation of Its Natural
Resources, 26 W. VA. L. Q. 1 (1919); Williams, The Power of the State to Control
the Use of Its Natural Resources, 11 MIN. L. REv. 129, 233 (1927) ; Simonton, The
Power of the State to Control the Export of Hydra-Electric Energy, 39 W. VA. L. Q. 4(1932) ; Rosenson, The Power of a State Over Its Natural Resources, 17 TuL. L. REv.
256 (1942); PECK, supra note 348; Bison, Economic Protective Powers of States
Under the Commerce Clause, 38 GEo. LJ. 590 (1950).370 Cf. McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892) ; Davis v.
Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
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Staten Island to New York City, the state court sustained the prohibi-
tion against constitutional attack by finding a "residuum of public
ownership" in the stream beyond the reasonable riparian uses, rein-
forced by state title to the tidal stream bed. "We will not say that the
considerations that we have stated do not warrant the conclusion
reached," wrote Holmes for the Supreme Court in Hudson Water Co. v.
McCarter.37" ' "But we prefer to put the authority which cannot be
denied to the State upon a broader ground than that which was empha-
sized below, since in our opinion it is independent of the more or less
attenuated residuum of title that the State may be said to possess."
Finding this broader ground in the public interest in conserving and
protecting the physical environment within the state's territory, Holmes
reached back to bring even the wild game cases under his reformula-
tion.3 72
New Jersey could prohibit the export of water from its streams irre-
spective of whether the water was in private or public ownership. But
when other states, blessed with large reserves of natural gas, sought to
extend their export controls from conserving the physical resource to
favoring the local economy or local consumers, the Court invoked the
common market philosophy of the commerce clause, over Holmes's
dissent. "[Oklahoma's] conservation is in a sense commercial,-the
business welfare of the state, as coal might be, or timber," said the
Court in 1911. "If the states have such power, a singular situation
might result. Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the Northwest its tim-
ber, the mining states their minerals ... embargo may be retaliated by
embargo, and commerce will be halted at state lines." 7' Twelve years
later a statutory priority to protect gas consumers within West Virginia
weighed no heavier in the balance than Oklahoma's economic objec-
tives, though Mr. Justice Holmes still saw "nothing in the commerce
clause to prevent a State from giving a preference to its inhabitants in
the enjoyment of its natural advantages..... The Court has recognized
371 209 U.S. 349, 354-55 (1908).
372 "On this principle of public interest and the police power, and not merely as the
inheritor of a royal prerogative, the State may make laws for the preservation of game,
which seems a stronger case. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534." Id. at 356.
Game laws, as in Geer, were again explained as "police" regulations independent of
title in New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31 (1908).
373 Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255 (1911).
374 Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 602 (1923) (Holmes, J. dissent-
ing) : "I am aware that there is some general language in Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural
Gas Co .... a decision that I thought wrong, implying that Pennsylvania might not
keep its coal, or the northwest its timber, etc. But I confess I do not see what is to
hinder. Certainly if the owners of the mines or the forests saw fit not to export their
products the Constitution would not make them do it. I see nothing in that instrument
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a legitimate state interest in conservation not only against physical but
also against economic waste of natural gas through dissipation in "in-
ferior" uses, though it has confined the state to controls over production
rather than over interstate trade;3.. but Holmes's straight-forward de-
fense of discriminatory resource management has not been accepted.
At times the Court has gone far to sustain state programs openly
designed to restrict trade in the state's products in the interests of the
state's economy. 76 Nevertheless, wherever the balance might be struck
in applying the commerce clause formulas of national interests and
local concerns, there is nothing to suggest that a state can tilt the scales
by socializing the intended means of its economic protectionism. Okla-
homa had in fact relied elaborately on its ownership of state highways
and withdrawal of its grant of eminent domain powers to keep pipe line
companies from exporting natural gas; the Court held that these state
facilities could not be withheld in discrimination against interstate
commerce.17 Louisiana legislation declared a local economic resource,
shrimp and oysters, to be the property of the state, so as to permit their
taking only when first-stage processing was carried on within the state.
This "public ownership" approach, even to a fishing resource, failed to
persuade the Court; it applied its Oklahoma and West Virginia natural
gas precedents to invalidate Louisiana's protectionist efforts under the
commerce clause. 7' Would those gas-producing states have been freer
to reserve that resource for their local economies if they held natural
gas reserves in public ownership? The Oregon legislature seems to
have thought so in 1961, when it enacted a statute directed against the
export of logs by requiring timber sold by the state or by any of its
political subdivisions to be "primarily processed in the United States
unless the State Forestry Department has issued.., a permit for the
processing of such timber elsewhere.. 75 Oregon's geographic limitation
that would produce a different result if the State gave the owners a motive for their
conduct, as by offering a bonus."
375 Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950); Northern
Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kansas, 372 U.S. 84, 94 (1963).
376 Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915) (immature oranges); Parker v. Brown,317 U.S. 341 (1943) (compulsory pooling of raisin crop to support price).
at7 Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 261-62 (1911).
378 Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928). Mr. Justice Butler,
who had previously thrown together title and "police power" terminology in Lacoste v.
Dep't of Conservation, 263 U.S. 45 (1924) to sustain 
a Lousiana severance tax col-
lected from dealers in wild animal hides, conceded that fish and game might be con-
served for consumption within the state, but here Louisiana's shrimp was destined for
export afte i r enforced processing within the state. Mr. Justice Holmes joi  the
Court rather than Mr. Justice McReynolds's dissent.
o On. Ra. SAT §§ 526.805 et. seq. (1963). Hood & Son referred to timber in re-
peating, in 1949, the apprehensions expressed in the opinions of 1911 and 1923 (stra
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on processing would violate the commerce clause were it imposed on
privately owned timber. If it could be used to reserve government-
owned timber as a base for local economic advancement, such a consti-
tutional distinction would create an important incentive for states to
socialize natural resources, by purchase, eminent domain, or otherwise,
solely for protectionist reasons backed by local processing interests.
This is what Louisiana did not succeed in doing.
In 1948, the Court turned another long unused siege gun against the
barricades. Again the prize was shrimp, which South Carolina sought
to reserve to resident fishermen, licensed at twenty-five dollars, by im-
posing a $2500 license on nonresidents' shrimp boats. The discrimina-
tion violated the nonresidents' privileges and immunities under article
IV, section 2, wrote Mr. Chief Justice Vinson for the majority in
Toomer v. Witsell:8 °
The primary purpose of this clause... was to help fuse into one Nation
a collection of independent, sovereign States. It was designed to insure
to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges
which the citizens of State B enjoy....
Like many other constitutional provisions, the privileges and immuni-
ties clause is not an absolute. It does bar discrimination against citizens
of other States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination
beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States. But it does
not preclude disparity of treatment in the many situations where there
are perfectly valid independent reasons for it. Thus the inquiry in each
case must be concerned with whether such reasons do exist and whether
the degree of discrimination bears a close relation to them.381
Conservation, urged by the state, could not justify the discriminatory
remedy chosen; the argument "overlooks the purpose of that clause,
which, as indicated above, is to outlaw classifications based on the fact
notes 373, 374): "We need only consider the consequences if each of the few states
that produce copper, lead, high-grade iron ore, timber, cotton, oil or gas should decree
that industries located in that state shall have priority. What fantastic rivalries and
dislocations and reprisals would ensue if such practices were begun !" Hood & Sons v.
DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 538-39 (1949). "Primarily processed," in the Oregon statute,
is defined as that stage of manufacture next beyond the log form. Compare the possi-
bility of basing a preference for local use of hydroelectric power on state development
of state-owned waterpower, e.g., ORE. CONST. art. XI-D; cf. SIMONTON, supra note
369; Smith, Maine's Power Embargo-How It May Be Terminated, 36 CORN. L. Q.
342 (1951).380 334 U.S. 385 (1948). The clause reads: "The Citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the Several States." Justices
Frankfurter and Jackson concurred on the basis of the commerce clause, wishing to
rest on the Foster-Fountain distinction between reservation for local consumption and
for economic gain in the nation's commerce. See supra, note 378.
381 Id. at 395-96.
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of citizenship unless there is something to indicate that non-citizens
constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is aimed.
3 82
What kind of evidence might show a peculiar relevance of nonciti-
zenship, beyond that mere fact itself, so as to furnish valid independent
reasons for a closely related degree of disparity of treatment? The
Court's formula requires identification of a material difference between
residents and nonresidents that is pertinent to the state program in-
volved. No doubt a state may deem a period of residence relevant for
admission to political participation in its government. Beyond that, the
most obvious sources of distinction are financial-typically, adminis-
trative cost differences attributable to non-residency, and the taxes that
may be contributed to state programs by residents and not by non-
residents. But the Court has made clear that "something more is re-
quired than bald assertion to establish a reasonable relation between
the higher fees and the higher cost." Thus it found that Alaska could
not in fact show that a five to fifty dollar license fee differential imposed
against nonresident fishermen "would merely compensate" for more
expensive enforcement.8 In any case, once more, public ownership
of the asset is not itself a "valid independent reason" for discrimina-
tion. In Toomer v. Witsell the Chief Justice limited the fish and game
exception to the precise facts of McCready v. Virginia,"s4 quoting Mr.
Justice Holmes that "To put the claim of the State upon title is to lean
upon a slender reed." '
Are other forms of public activity-government purchasing, manage-
ment, public services-a stronger reed than title to support a state's
discrimination in favor of its residents that otherwise lacks "valid inde-
pendent reason"? The implications of article IV, section 2, for consti-
tutional rights in the public sector exceed even those of the commerce
clause. For it is immaterial to the privileges and immunities clause
whether it is interstate commerce, or indeed any economic process, that
the state seeks to close to nonresidents. When a state's scheme to rig its
market to the disadvantage of outsiders is challenged under the com-
882 Id. at 398.
3 8 3 Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415,418 (1952).
38 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
385 334 U.S. at 401, quoting from Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
The opinion also quotes Roscoe Pound to trace the state ownership fiction concerning
wild game to a confusion between imperium and dominium, concluding that the state's
power to regulate the exploitation of an important resource can be adequately exercised,
"like its other powers, so as not to discriminate without reason against citizens of
other States." Mr. Justice Douglas had occasion to explore the difference between
dominiun and imperium in United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 712-19 (1950), when
the Court held that Texas lost both with respect to the marginal sea when it entered
the Union on an "equal footing" with other states.
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merce clause, it is the national interest in a free market that is weighed
against the local objective, whether the challenger complains from
within or without the state. But the nonresident attacking state dis-
crimination under article IV, section 2, need not overbalance the state's
policy by demonstrating a greater national interest entrusted to Con-
gress; it is his own privileges and immunities, precisely as a citizen of
a different state of the Union, that the Constitution protects in this
section. It places on the state the burden of justifying every disparity
of treatment by adequate reasons other than the urge to distinguish
between residents and outsiders itself-that simple political motive so
self-evident as to have been made the specific target of article IV.
The state as buyer of goods or services is presumably no more im-
mune than as seller of socialized shrimp or conservator of other re-
sources. Under article IV, section 2, a nonresident railroad construc-
tion contractor has been held to be entitled to equality with residents in
Tennessee occupational taxation, in order to assure nonresidents equal
opportunity with Tennessee citizens to construct railroads in that
state. 8 ' To protect a builder of highways instead of railroads, the same
constitutional policy would have to assure him equal opportunity to
compete for a public contract. Of course, public purchase regulations
may impose independently valid requirements-labor standards, mate-
rials inspection, and probably a price differential to reflect fairly the
taxes the state would recapture from resident suppliers. These might
meet the constitutional test of article IV even if they were imposed as
state laws or regulations on purchasing by similar private businesses
in the state, for example by regulated private utilities. But regulation
to exclude the foreigner would fail. A few weeks before Mr. Justice
Douglas's appointment, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's first opinion for the
Court declared unconstitutional a Florida statute requiring special in-
spection only of cement imported from abroad, at a fee several times
the national tariff on cement and said to amount to sixty times the cost
of inspection.387 Since the discrimination was against foreign goods,
not against nonresident citizens, the decision rested on the commerce
clause rather than article IV. But Florida's policy would be no less
discriminatory if it were administered directly in the procurement of
cement by state agencies, or required by the state road department of
private construction contractors on public projects. A state's policy of
absolute or prohibitively great preferences for local suppliers and labor
31s Chalker v. Birmingham & Northwestern Ry. Co., 249 U.S. 522 (1919).
387 Hale v. Bimco Trading Co., 306 U.S. 375 (1939).
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cannot long expect to base its survival on the fact that it regulates
purchases by a public rather than a private entity.
How far will the nonresident's constitutional right to equal privileges
and immunities force the state to open the doors to all of it lands,
its resources, its social services and institutions? No delimiting line
appears self-evidently logical. Would the test of Toomer v. Witsell
permit Washington to reserve its state parks for its residents? Pre-
sumably a tourist from Portland or Boise takes up no more space and
leaves no more litter than a tourist from Seattle. 8' Is a state university
campus different, under article IV, section 2, from a state park? The
University of Oregon, like other state universities, imposes not only
higher tuition but also higher academic entrance requirements, on non-
resident than on resident students.8" The reason to limit nonresident
enrollment by higher admission standards is, of course, to prevent the
overcrowding of limited academic facilities; yet a nonresident student
can no more than a resident be identified as a "peculiar source of the
evil" unless one first assumes the very conclusion that such facilities
may be limited to residents-an assumption that, contrary to Toomer,
would justify discrimination by the mere fact of residence without any
other identifiable distinction between the applying students. 90 The
argument of scarcity alone has failed to justify reservation of other
resources for use by residents. 9' If, on the other hand, a state's interest
in the education of those who are likely to be its own future citizens is
a sufficient "valid independent reason" to discriminate in the use of
limited educational facilities, then a state-imposed priority for resident
students applied even to private colleges would withstand attack by
nonresidents based on article IV, section 2-whatever other constitu-
tional claims a private college might itself be able to raise under the
388 The Oregon Supreme Court has applied art. IV, § 2, to invalidate a statutory
preference for Oregon residents in access to grazing districts encompassing private
and federal range; nothing suggests that state-owned lands could be exempted. Men-
diola v. Graham, 139 Ore. 592, 10 P2d 911 (1932).
389 University of Oregon Bulletin, Catalog Issue, 1964-65, pp. 65-66 (difference be-
tween high school grade point requirement of 2.25 for residents, 2.75 for non-residents).
Cf. University of Washington Bulletin (General Catalog Issue) 1964-65, p. 27: "The
University recognizes the academic and educational benefits derived from a cosmopol-
itan student body and accepts highly qualified nonresidents who are able to meet
significantly higher scholastic standards. As a state institution, preference must be
given to residents of Washington and to sons and daughters of Washington alumni,
who are accepted according to resident standards, although they are required to pay
the regular nonresident fees."
390 Differences in scholastic records required for admission might, for instance, bejustifiable if a state could show that its high schools imposed stricter standards for
academic grades than those in other states.
391 Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
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fourteenth amendment. Again, the result does not depend on distinc-
tions between state regulation of the private and state operation of the
public sector.
That distinction does remain relevant to the state's use of its fiscal
resources. Presumably a state may demand of nonresidents through
tuition, or in other types of higher fees, that cost of its services which
its resident population supports through taxes.392 In the allocation of
costs, in the refusal to subsidize, rather than in historical notions
of what is "fundamental" 9 ' or distinctions between commercial and
non-commercial interests, a line may be found between permissible
and impermissible constraints on outsiders' access to the state's public
sector. But differences even in fees cannot exceed what may fairly be
called compensatory; they must not reflect an effort to disguise exclu-
sion of nonresidents."' Only in the selective use of direct subsidy do
the states perhaps retain some means immune from constitutional
attack to let charity, and economic self-help, begin and end at home."9 '
When the demands of the commerce clause and article IV, section 2,
are thus brought to bear on the public economic and social programs of
state and local government themselves, the conflict is between com-
peting principles to each of which Mr. Justice Douglas has been
strongly committed. He has defended the role of the states as inde-
pendent organs of experimentation and social services and has sought
to protect them against federal fiscal centralization. 6 He is equally
committed to the nationalizing role of those two constitutional clauses
in overcoming state parochialism directly, even without Congressional
action. 97 The conflict is inevitable; separate governments are bound to
392 See with respect to nonresident tuition, Landwehr v. Regents of Univ. of Colo.,
396 P.2d 451 (Colo. 1964); unfortunately the Colorado Supreme Court's brief and
inadequate opinion omits any analysis of plaintiff's claim under art. IV, § 2.
393 Cf. Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C.C. 371, Fed. Cas. No. 3230 (1825) ; Mr. Just-
ice Frankfurter, concurring, in Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 407 (1948).
394 Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952). The same test seems pertinent for
percentage differentials applied to public procurement. States have been accorded ex-
ceptional leeway in levying taxes on highway users that might unconstitutionally strike
at interstate commerce in other contexts, but are justified as contributions to the cost
and upkeep of the public roads. See Barrett, "Substance" vs. "Forn" in the Application
of the Commerce Clause to State Taxation, 101 U. PA. L. Rnv. 740, 785-89 (1953).
395 Cf. Holmes, J., dissenting, Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 602(1923). Note, The Constitution and State Control of Natural Resources, 64 HARv. L.
REv. 642, 651 (1951).
396 New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946), discussed, 39 WASH. L. REV.
4, 21-28 (1964), and cf. Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946), Hulbert v. Twin Falls
County, 327 U.S. 103 (1946).
397 H. P. Hood & Sons v. Dumont, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Bibb v. Navajo Freight
Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas) ; he also was with
the Court in Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 395 (1948) ; Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S.
415 (1952) ; Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964).
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give serious domestic objectives priority over those of a greater com-
munity, whether in the international or in a federal system. But solu-
tions once designed to maintain the benefits of a common market in a
private economy must find new applications as the sectors of the econ-
omy under direct public management become increasingly important.
Thus, equal access to the public sectors of member states has been rec-
ognized as a significant objective of the European Economic Commu-
nity."8 In addition, the problems of access to public hospitals and
health and welfare plans, and the transfer of eligibility for other social
benefits, are no less important than the businessman's access to a mar-
ket, if there is to be mobility of the labor force in a common economy
while social programs are administered by geographically delimited
states.
For more than economic reasons this fact is likely to tip the scales
toward the national principles of the Constitution in deciding a conflict
with state efforts to use their proprietary and fiscal powers to help their
own economies and residents. For most people, the law and economics
of social benefits in the modern world will also be the determinants
of personal freedom. After two years on the Court, Mr. Justice Doug-
las heard California argue that it could punish a man for bringing
to that golden state an unemployed relative who would add to its heavy
social burdens. The Court in Edwards v. California"' held that the
commerce clause prohibited any such "attempts on the part of any
single State to isolate itself from difficulties common to all of them by
restraining the transportation of persons and-property across its bor-
• Eric Stein reports: "A very special problem arises in connection with assuring
access for all Community nationals and companies to contracts for the supply of goods
and services awarded by governmental departments, municipalities, provinces and other
public entities. Since the role of governments in national economies has been steadily
on the uptrend, important portions of economic activities would be excluded from
Community-wide competition unless free access to, and participation on an equal basis
in, the public tender procedures is assured. The Commission has been working on two
directives: one will be based on the Rome Treaty provisions concerning the right of
establishment and supply of services, and its purpose will be to ensure that specific
restrictions discriminating against the nationals and companies of the member states on
the ground of nationality are removed .... The working group dealing with this prob-
lem concluded that a removal of discriminatory legal restrictions would not be enough
to achieve the removal of discrimination in practice, and as a result a second directive
is in preparation which will list the procedures which may be employed in awarding
contracts for public works, fix the conditions under which the members will apply one
or the other of these procedures, and provide a consultation procedure in case of
complaints. In terms of the economic impact, this might prove to be one of the most
important steps in the approximation of laws, since the national public markets have
been traditionally more or less closed to outsiders." Stein, Assimilation of National
Laws as a Function, of European Integration, 58 Am. J. IxTI. L. 1, 12-13 (1964).
300 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
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ders."' ° But Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, was not prepared to rest
unconstitutionality on the ground that California had lost its power
over commerce to Congress. "I am of the opinion that the right of
persons to move freely from State to State occupies a more protected
position in our constitutional system than does the movement of cattle,
fruit, steel and coal across state lines," he wrote.4"' California's exclu-
sion of indigent nonresidents could not in fact survive article IV, sec-
tion 2. But Douglas would go further and hold freedom of movement
among the states to be an incident of national citizenship recognized
since Crandall v. Nevada.. and thereafter protected by the privileges
and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment.
That result necessarily follows unless perchance a State can curtail the
right of free movement of those who are poor and destitute. But to allow
such an exception to be engrafted on the right of national citizenship
would be to contravene every conception of national unity.... It would
prevent a citizen because he was poor from seeking new horizons in other
States. It might thus withhold from large segments of our people that
mobility which is basic to any guarantee of freedom of opportunity. The
result would be a substantial dilution of the rights of national citizenship,
a serious impairment of the principles of equality. 0 3
The move to revive the privileges and immunities clause of the four-
teenth amendment did not develop past its high water mark of 1941.
But the same choice as between the competing claims of Mr. Edwards's
brother-in-law and of California recurs also under the commerce
clause and article IV,4 4 when a state restricts a nonresident's access to
its public sector. In the welfare state, freedom of movement for a tour-
400 Id. at 173, continuing with a quotation from Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511
(1935).
40L Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941).
402 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867), invalidating a Nevada tax on every person leaving
the state by common carrier. That decision could not rest on art. IV, § 2, since Ne-
vada's tax had applied equally to residents and nonresidents.
403 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 181 (1941). Justices Black and Murphy
joined this concurring opinion. Mr. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion, his first, also
chose this ground: "the migrations of a human being, of whom it is charged that he
possesses nothing that can be sold and has no wherewithal to buy, do not fit easily into
my notions as to what is commerce. To hold that the measure of his rights is the com-
merce clause is likely to result eventually either in distorting the commercial law or in
denaturing human rights.... I think California had no right to make the condition of
Duncan's purse, with no evidence of violation by him of any law or social policy which
caused it, the basis of excluding him or of punishing one who extended him aid." Id. at
182, 185.
404 Similar issues may arise under the equal protection clause; cf. Mr. Justice Doug-
las's citation of Edwards v. California in dissent when the Court sustained the applica-
tion to a lawyer with offices in Kansas and Missouri of a Kansas rule that attorneys
practicing in another state must associate another Kansas attorney. Martin v. Walton,
368 U.S. 25, 26-28 (1961).
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ist includes access to public parks and lands; for a student, access to
colleges outside his state; for families with infirm members, access to
public hospitals; for the unemployed and the poor, eligibility in a new
community for employment on the public works, for unemployment
benefits, for welfare. Yet even if article IV, section 2, will protect the
non-resident against absolute exclusion or disqualification, the constitu-
tional rights it can provide will remain hollow for many as long as
social expenditures may be limited to residents, and nonresidents,
though admitted, may be made to pay their way. As the Court recog-
nized in Edwards, the answer to this aspect of the dilemma of federal-
ism will be found in the increasing financial federalization of social
programs.10" There is less and less reason to accord states a privilege of
parochialism in the management of public resources, institutions, and
services that would be decried as unconstitutional "Balkanization" if
imposed by them on comparable private activities within their borders.
IX. THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
In the past quarter century, the service and management functions of
government have become more important to many Americans than its
application of regulatory and prohibitory laws. Individuals rely on gov-
ernment for many of their most vital needs-for education, security
against loss of income in old age or unemployment, often also for
hospitalization, for housing, for welfare payments, to provide at least
minimally for the absolute necessities of life. Others train for and
405 Mr. Justice Byrnes read the lesson to the states in the coming of federal social
responsibility:
"[We] are not now called upon to determine anything other than the propriety of an
attempt by a State to prohibit the transportation of indigent non-residents into its
territory. The nature and extent of its obligation to afford relief to newcomers is
not here involved. We do, however, suggest that the theory of the Elizabethan poor
laws no longer fits the facts. Recent years, and particularly the past decade, have
been marked by a growing recognition that in an industrial society the task of pro-
viding assistance to the needy has ceased to be local in character. The duty to share
the burden, if not wholly to assume it, has been recognized not only by State govern-
ments, but by the Federal government as well [listing social security, old age assist-
ance, aid to the blind and to dependent children, the WP.A., farm security laws].
This is not to say that our judgment would be different if Duncan had received
relief from local agencies in Texas and California. Nor is it to suggest that the
financial burden of assistance to indigent persons does not continue to fall heavily
upon local and State governments. It is only to illustrate that in not inconsiderable
measure the relief of the needy has become the common responsibility and concern
of the whole nation." 314 U.S. at 174-75.
Eligibility rules for nonresidents may be incorporated in the federal programs, or the
presence of substantial federal funds in a state program might be judicially held to
remove the constitutional basis for imposing any significant differential charge on non-
residents. Of course, state laws may themselves provide for reciprocal transferability
of earned eligibility, e.g. in unemployment compensation.
19651
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enter upon careers in which government is the only significant em-
ployer. Private entrepreneurs of farm and factory see government
as an important, often as their only, customer; others, for instance
the timber-based industries and the electric utilities of the Pacific
Northwest, as their chief source of supply.
The growth of the public sector has not occurred without a good deal
of ideological furor directed to individual controversies against public
power, urban renewal, or "socialized medicine." But today doctrinaire
negation of the entire role of public services is rare. We have become
used to the thought that the United States is a mixed economy. The
growth of the public sector has also had profound consequences for the
tasks of modern constitutional adjudication. But like that growth, the
response of the law has also been episodic, ad hoc, enlivened by ideo-
logical rhetoric, but devoid of a consistent theory of constitutional
rights in affirmative government actions. On that question, our consti-
tutional law is as mixed as the economy in which it must be applied.I This is only natural. It is our good fortune to have made changes by
solving concrete problems pragmatically, by evolution, not revolution;
no systematic political or economic theory has been embodied in a
single new code and given to the courts to apply. There have been
enough strains on maintaining consistency and continuity in modern
constitutional law apart from the question of its place in the public
sector. During Mr. Justice Douglas's years on the Supreme Court, the
substantive meanings of the various constitutional guarantees have
been hotly contested. So has the fundamental issue of the role of the
courts in enforcing adherence to these guarantees. Choices between
diametrically opposed views have often been made by the narrowest of
divisions. Then the accidents of time and politics in changing the
Court's membership have brought sharp reversals of approach both to
the Constitution's substantive values and to the judicial function. A
new decision may cast doubt on precedents that reflect an earlier theory
but is not directly at stake in the case. Yet the Court's judicial role
obliges it to save explicit overruling for the exceptional case when the
change of direction unavoidably means discard of a precedent recog-
nized to be squarely in point. Thus decisions from an era when direct
operation was a factor likely to exempt government from otherwise
applicable constitutional restraints remain on the books alongside de-
segregation holdings that find in the slightest government participation
the factor triggering application of such restraints. At first, the fact of
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public ownership invites simple but natural analogies with private own-
ership, and tends to insulate public management from the constitutional
obligations of government. In the end, public ownership, management,
or financial support tends to make government responsible for all social
decisions."'8 But the significance-as excluding or as invoking consti-
tutional rights-to be attached to this factor has clearly differed not
only with time, but with the high or low value seen by shifting majori-
ties in the several guarantees of the Constitution. With so many vari-
ables, it is not surprising that the scores of opinions in cases contesting
constitutional claims in the public sector have not focused on this com-
mon denominator as a problem for evolving doctrinal consistency.
Yet if our pursuit of that common denominator has discovered no
consistency explicit in established doctrine, consistency is implicit to a
high degree in the votes and opinions of Mr. Justice Douglas. The
reason is plain: When a litigant asserts that government has crossed
constitutional bounds, Douglas looks first at the injury done to the
citizen and not to the government's choice of weapons. He is concerned
with effects, not with forms. In this approach to constitutional issues,
he follows his earliest commitment to the American legal realism of the
1920's. As a 30-year-old assistant professor at Yale Law School, he
406 The extent to which constitutional claims may in the modern state reach major
"privat' economic units has called forth an extensive theoretical literature. See in
addition to authorities cited, 39 WAsH. L. REv. 4, 45 n. 161, Friedmann, Corporate
Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law, 57 CoLUM. L. RyV. 155 (1957);
Hanslowe, Regulation by Visible Public and Invisible Private Government, 40 Tax L.
REv. 88 (1961); Freedom it the Modern American Economy: A Symposium, 55
Nw. U. L. Ray. (1960), including a trenchant critique of the new preoccupation with
private power structures in Manning, Corporate Power and Individual Freedom: Some
General Analysis and Particular Reservations, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 38 (1960); Wel-
lington, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and "Governmental Action," 70 YAE L.J.
345 (1960) ; Freund, New Vistas in Constitutional Law, 112 U. PA. L. Rav. 631, 639-44(1964) ; Horowitz, Fourteenth Amendment Aspects of Racial Discrimination in "Pri-
vate' Housing, 52 CA.Lw. L. Ray. 1, notes 2, 3 (1964) ; Comment, Private Governmnt
on the Campus-Judicil Review of Universty Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1361 (1963).In a review of HAxvrnDLI & HAHDLiN, THE DIxMNSIONS or Llamax,, Mr. Justice Doug-
las wrote in the N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1961, Book Review, p. 3:
"Should not corporate giants be considered as 'states'? Is it not naive to think of
them as 'persons'? ... The constitutional literature is a continuing exhibit of negative
liberty. The authors quite properly go much further afield to show that a viable society
is one where various types of power co-exist, offsetting one another.... The shudder
that passed through our Union League clubs and our bar associations when the specter
of Socialism appeared on the American scene is mentioned but not in its full vigor.
Americans turned their back on that creed and government ground onward-from a
commonwealth concept to the concept of arbiter and finally to the welfare state."
Douglas's view on the constitutional obligations of government-sponsored groups is
illustrated in his opinions in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,
775 (1961) (concurring), and Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 877 (1961) (dissent-
ing), that labor unions and bar associations with legally compulsory memberships
should not be entitled to use compulsory dues for politically controversial purposes.
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told the annual convention of law teachers to bring realism into their
classes in corporation law, to analyze the functions of financing, man-
agement, and of allocating control and risk of loss, rather than the cate-
gories of "corporation," "partnership," and "agency." Those categories
made for easy classification of cases, he said; "the importance of the
form of the unit is apt to make the regulation of that form the focal
point; the ancient stress on details of organization emphasizes form;
the increasing importance of certain businesses is likely to bring into
consciousness devices which are being used by business in terms of the
regulation of the device used...... As a consequence the legal analysis
of American business enterprise tended toward metaphysics. "The
analysis, the rules, the theology emphasized the business unit. It was
this. It was not that. It could do this. It could not do that. It was
different from this but similar to that .... 408
A theology not fashioned in concepts which earmarked it as part of a
specific economic and social order soon knew no industrial society for its
forbears and readily adjusted itself to no economic and social order as its
inheritance. The consequence was that the unit instead of being visual-
ized as a device adjustable to a changing order and as a vehicle for the
accomplishment of certain specific business functions was apt to be pic-
tured as static. What the functions were was obscured. What vital proc-
esses were involved was concealed.... The analysis has been so concep-
tualized that the attention is too frequently focused on the device used
rather than on the function which the device is intended to perform. 40 9
And he hailed the beginning shift of emphasis "from the vehicle em-
ployed to the function performed."'41
Substitute for "business" in these quotations the word "government,"
and they describe the Douglas methodology in constitutional law as in
corporation law. What law is to business enterprise, constitutional law
is to government. If in the 1930's law could control its corporate crea-
tures only by looking beyond forms and devices to functions and effects,
the same is true of the constitutional law of the modern state. In such
an approach, none of the manifold devices of modern government is
immune from constitutional restraint. If the effect of a governmental
decision is to invade a constitutionally protected interest, it is no answer
407 Douglas, A Functional Approach to the Law of Business Associations, paper
read at the round table on Business Associations at the meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools, Chicago, Dec. 1928, 23 ILL. L. REv. 673 (1929).
408 Id. at 674. For a review of Professor Douglas's empirical studies in the half-
dozen years before he left teaching for the Securities and Exchange Commission, see
Jennings, Mr. Justice Douglas: His Influence on Corporate and Securities Regulation,
73 YALE L.J. 920, 921-23 (1964) and book reviews cited there.
409 Douglas, supra note 407, at 674-75. 410 Ibid.
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that government has cast itself in the role of landowner or employer,
banker, business manager, or educator, rather than that of lawgiver and
policeman. The form of the governmental invasion indeed makes a
difference; the use of criminal prosecution, for instance, carries its
special constitutional procedures. But none escapes simply by the
choice of form from scrutiny of function and effect.
Though this may describe the approach of Mr. Justice Douglas, it is
not yet the law of the Court. Much challenged governmental action
does escape scrutiny, not necessarily because of any substantive signifi-
cance attached to the government's method of action, but because of
formal barriers to judicial review. One device to effect a policy may be
held to be in government's "unreviewable discretion" while another
means to the same end would not be. Challengers may be met at the
courthouse door by assertions of sovereign immunity or by denials of
their "standing." Such formal barriers surround especially the power
to spend, to subsidize by grant, by loan or by tax exemption, 11 and to
buy, sell, or manage property-the economic instruments of the public
sector. Obviously they become increasingly critical to the constitu-
tional law of the welfare state.
Since the days of the T.V.A. cases just before Mr. Justice Douglas's
appointment,"2 the Court has often wavered in its use of these tech-
niques of judicial abstention when confronted with a substantial con-
411 Denial of tax benefits can invade first amendment as well as other constitutional
rights, Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); in Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513 (1958), Mr. Justice Clark was alone in still speaking of "legislative lar-
gesse," "bounty," and the "sovereign's grace." Mr. Justice Douglas, distinguishing
Speiser in his concurrence in Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959),
when a taxpayer in Washington demanded a federal income tax deduction for expenses
incurred in defeating a Washington initiative measure at the polls, maintained that
government need not through tax deductions "subsidize!' the costs of exercising first
amendment rights provided it does not penalize the exercise of these rights by disqualifi-
cation from a tax exemption otherwise available.
Beyond disqualification and restraints, however, first amendment rights can be in-
vaded by the grant of a tax exemption to another. An issue fundamental to political
democracy is raised, for instance, by modem proposals for tax incentives to encourage
individual political campaign contributions. See Goldman, Income Tax Incentives for
Political Contributions: A Study of the 1963 Proposals, 11 U.C.L.AJL. REv. 212 (1964).
As a consequence of progressive income tax rates, a tax deduction would mean that
government picked up a larger share of the check for a high-income taxpayer's political
favorite than for his poorer neighbor's candidate. (A tax credit would subsidize the
contributions of taxpayers equally but discriminate between political contributions of
taxpayers and of those below the tax threshold.) Tax incentives for political contribu-
tions which due to progressive tax rates were in fact unequal have been held unconsti-
tutional in the Federal Republic of Germany, 8 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDmsVR-
FASSUNGSGEecHTs 51 (BVerfGE 8, 51) (1958) ; cf. BVerfGE 6, 273 (1957).
412 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1938) (concurring opinion of Justices
Brandeis, Stone, Roberts and Cardozo) ; Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464
(1938); Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939) (denying standing
to challenge government competition).
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stitutional claim, and they remain high on the agenda of unfinished
business in constitutional law."18 In dealing with such preliminary
questions, Douglas has been a vocal critic of procedural doctrines that
would deny litigants the benefit of the courts' power to protect consti-
tutional rights. With Mr. Justice Murphy, he dissented from Mr.
Justice Rutledge's Rescue Army restatement of the policy limiting the
exercise of that power to cases of "strict necessity." 1 ' In 1962 he sum-
marized his stand on that policy in reviewing the Court's "niggardly"
decisions on the use of declaratory judgments-a remedy which he has
often defended against judicial hedging and narrowing."15 He wrote
that
These cases illustrate the restrictive nature of the judge-made rules which
have made the federal courts so inhospitable to litigation to vindicate pri-
vate rights. At no time has the Court been wholly consistent; nor have I
.... But my maturing view is that courts do law and justice a disservice
when they close their doors to people who, though not in jail nor yet
penalized, live under a regime of peril and insecurity. What are courts
for, if not for removing clouds on title, as well as adjudicating the rights
of those against whom the law is aimed, though not immediately
applied ?41'
And he professed himself to have "great difficulty" with Frothingham
v. Mellon,417 the precedent denying federal taxpayer actions that has
rationalized unreviewability of federal spending programs for four
decades.
This stand also implies a jaundiced view of other barriers erected in
the past against litigating the government's choice in the public sector.
In 1940, Douglas still had joined in an all-but-unanimous decision
denying potential government contractors the right to challenge gov-
ernment wage determinations on the broad ground that, "like private
individuals and business, the Government enjoys the unrestricted
413 See, e.g., DAVIs, ADMINIsTRATivE LAw TREATIsE, §§ 22.04, 22.05, 22.09-10, 22.15,
also ch. 28 (1958) and 1963 Pocket Parts; Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review:
Public Actions, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1265 (1961); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial
Review, Private Actions, 75 HARv. L. REv. 255 (1961) ; Lewis, Constitutional Rights
and the Misuse of Standing, 14 STAN. L. RFv. 433 (1962) ; Comment, The Blacklisted
Contractor and the Question of Standing to Sue, 56 Nw. U. L. REV. 811 (1962) ; see
also Peck, Standing Requirements for Obtaining Review of Governmental Action in
Washington, 35 WAsia. L. REv. 362 (1960).
414 Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-75 (1947), citing the Bran-
deis concurrence in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1938).
415 See, e.g., United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 115 (1947) ; Doremus v.
Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 435 (1952) ; Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497-509 (1961).
416 Pub. Affairs Press v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 116 (1962).
41T 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
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power to produce its own supplies, to determine those with whom it will
deal, and to fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make
needed purchases." '418 A decade later he protested against according
unreviewable finality to an agency's administrative determinations in a
contract dispute between itself and a private contractor. "Law has
reached its finest moments when it has freed man from the unlimited
discretion of some ruler, some civil or military official, some bureau-
crat," begins his dissent. "Where discretion is absolute, man has always
suffered .... It is more destructive of freedom than any of man's other
inventions." Contract theory indeed could make the private business
consent in advance to such determinations or forego its government
contract. "But the rule we announce has wide application and a devas-
tating effect. It makes a tyrant out of every contracting officer.... A
citizen who has an appeal to a body independent of the controversy has
protection against passion, obstinacy, irrational conduct, and incompe-
tency of an official."4 9 For Mr. Justice Douglas, more than contract
theory is relevant when one of the two contracting parties is also a gov-
ernment. He is equally skeptical when government seeks to defend
against private claims in tort, property, or other interests by asserting
a special governmental privilege or immunity.
4 20
Thus in his approach to the preliminary questions of the judicial
function, as to the merits of constitutional issues, Mr. Justice Douglas
would keep the focus on the substance of the litigant's complaint rather
than on the formal status of the government's activity.42' That focus
concentrates attention on the impact of the activity in society, on re-
sults rather than formulas, on consistency of doctrine with respect to
categorical constitutional values rather than to categories of govern-
418 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940), citing Atkin v. Kansas,
191 U.S. 207 (1903), Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246 (1907), and Heim v. McCall,
239 U.S. 175 (1915), as well as Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118
(1939), and Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938).
419 United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 101-02 (1951).
420 Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947) (permitting suit to recover property from
federal officer over claim of sovereign immunity) ; Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643,
648 (1962) (dissent from applying sovereign immunity in electment actions to try
claims to federally-held land, distinguishing Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337
U.S. 682 (1949)); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 174( 1951) (concurring on standing of organization to challenge government listing as
"Communist"; with respect to "standing," see also his dissent in Communist Party v.Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 186 (1961)) ; Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367, 381 (1951) (dissent from absolute privilege for state legislator under federal
Civil Rights Act); cf. Barrv. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 578 (1959) (dissent).42C indifference extends to the hats government may wear as complainant, not
only as respondent, see Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (per-
mitting state to bring anti-trust suit irrespective of distinction between state's "proprie-tary" and "patens pariae" roles).
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mental action. In doing so, it also points the way toward a consistent
theory of constitutional rights in the public sector.
Such issues of constitutional rights occur at the intersection of two
dimensions-the wide range of diverse public activities in the welfare
state and the Constitution's various substantive and procedural limits
on the exercise of governmental power.422 If a litigant is able to reach
the merits in court, as Mr. Justice Douglas favors, his claim against the
administration of one of the government's programs may arise under
any of those constitutional guarantees. Often it may involve several
together."2 But when these guarantees are examined individually, few
appear directly to concern a difference between the private and the
public sector; between government regulation and government opera-
tion. The outstanding one is the guarantee of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments against deprivation of private property without just com-
pensation or due process of law. 4
Government cannot take private property and turn it into public
property without just compensation. It cannot impose on private own-
ers the obligation to sacrifice their capital to a losing operation, though
it can itself conduct the same operation at a fiscal loss. Drawing the
line between non-compensable regulation and compensable confiscation
has its own difficulties of theory and application.2 5 What matters here
is that the constitutional limits on government regulation differ from
those on government operation when a litigant asserts the specific con-
stitutional rights of a private owner. But compensation aside, Mr.
Justice Douglas recognizes regulation and operation as interchangeable
instruments of public policy. The legislative choice is "merely the
means to the end," he wrote in Berman v. Parker."6 "The public end
may be as well or better served through an agency of private enterprise
than through a department of government-or so the Congress might
conclude. We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of
422 See 39 WASH. L. Rv. 4, 8 (1964).
423 E.g., denial of first amendment freedoms and procedural due process in personnel
discharges, see 39 WASH. L. Rtv. 4, 42 (1964), or in disqualification from social bene-
fits, see text accompanying note 244 supra.
424 The contract clause, art. I, § 10, cl. 1, and the several specific limits on taxation
have had little recent importance.
425 See, e.g., the opposing opinions of Justices Black and Douglas in Baltimore &
0. R.R. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 146 (1953) ; of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny
County in Perspective: 77irty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SUP.
CT. REv. 63; Sax Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) ; cf. Mr.
Justice Douglas's opinions granting compensation in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256 (1946), and Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), 39 WASH. L. REv. 4,
13, nn. 29-33 (1964).
42; 348 U.S. 26 (1954) ; 39 WASH. L. R1v. 4, 11-13 (1964).
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promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment projects.
... The rights of these property owners are satisfied when they receive
that just compensation which the fifth amendment exacts as the price of
the taking.'
27
The legislative choice among alternative instruments may result from
many variables: The presence or absence of existing private opera-
tions, the novelty or magnitude of the task, the degree of economic
feasibility or risk, the importance of politically independent or of po-
litically responsible management, the urgency of achieving the desired
objective and the political acceptability of the proposed means.'28 Yet
why should the choice of means affect other constitutional guarantees
besides those provided for private economic rights as such? Nothing in
those other limitations with which the Constitution surrounds govern-
ment action speaks of another variable: of an option, by choosing
public operation, to circumvent these constitutional guarantees as they
would be applied to public regulation of the same operation in private
hands. On the contrary, such an option would invite government to
negate constitutional limitations by socialization whenever it seemed
sufficiently essential to circumvent them, whether these be the limita-
tions of the commerce clause on a state's economic self-interest or the
first amendment freedoms of employees in important industries., 9 That
would be to make the form of the unit, the device used, the focal point;
it would subvert the flexibility to "pick and choose the best device for
427 348 U.S. at 36 (1954).
428 Among the many historic illustrations, such as the decisions to provide public
education, to subsidize construction of private railroads but to build public highways,
and to maintain regulated private communication utilities, the choice between pursuing
agreed ends by means in the private or in the public sector has itself often been the
bitterly contested issue, e.g. in rural electrification and the generation and distribution
of hydro-electric power, in industrial accident and retirement medical insurance, or in
sharing the public space program with private communication satellites.
420 Through the device of taking over possession and operation of industrial plants
in labor disputes, government has been able to cut off statutory rights, see United
States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947), though Justices
Black and Douglas, concurring, insisted it must be a true government operation for its
own account: a symbolic seizure would be "the equivalent of the Government's seeking
an injunction for the benefit of the private employers." Id. at 329. If government, by
using law to seize rather than to regulate industrial operations, can cut off rights other
than those of property, it must be because no constitutional guarantee stands in the way,
not because the Constitution forces government to seize rather than to legislate in order
to overcome the guarantee. Public employees have no constitutional right to strike
against a public operation, e.g., a municipal utility or a county hospital, presumably
because employees of the analogous non-governmental operation would have no consti-
tutional right to strike in the face of a law prohibiting it. Compare, with respect to
employees' political rights, Mr. Justice Douglas's dissent in United Public Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) quoted in 39 WASH. L. REv., 4, 33 (1964), and discussion,
pp. 39-40. See also Anderson, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 1961 Wis. L.
Rr. 601.
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each task at hand."43 That cannot be the construction of constitutional
guarantees if function and effect are the test.
Of course a particular claim that the effect of a governmental deci-
sion in the management of a public operation infringes constitutional
rights may or may not have merit. But to focus on the effects rather
than the means of government action removes the false analogy. The
relevant measure of the constitutionality of government action is not
the analogy of public management and private management. It is the
comparison of governmental decisions in a public operation with gov-
ernmental regulation of the analogous operation in private hands. The
relevant question is not whether the complainant-be he an employee,
a contractor, a student, an insurance beneficiary-could make his
claim against the action of the public managers if they were private.
It is whether he could object if that action had been imposed upon com-
parable private managers by governmental decision. Constitutional
rights against government action in the private sector (beyond the eco-
nomic rights secured to the private owner as such) are the measure of
constitutional rights in the public sector when effects rather than de-
vices are seen as the object of constitutional guarantees."'
"Certain rights are protected.., certain things shall not be done,"
430 Douglas, The Human Welfare State, Rensen Bird Lecture at Occidental Col-
lege, Los Angeles, California, 1949, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 597 (1949).
431 Like all attempts at simple formulations in constitutional law, this one is of
course suspect. But there are several answers to whether it unrealistically restrains
government's managerial freedom if applied to various hypothetical situations. First,
it says nothing about governmental actions that could have no private analogue subject
to government regulation, e.g. the President's choice of his chief cabinet, military, or
diplomatic officers, or a state's selection of judges. Second, and most important, the
analogy leaves government's discretion to manage as broad as its power to regulate, and
that is very broad. Suppose government undertook to impose on non-public institutions
state-prescribed criteria of eligibility for academic degrees (see note 236 supra), or
priorities for admission, e.g., veterans' preferences, or the same for employment (cf. 50
U.S.C. App. § 459, Sullivan Drydock and Repair Co. v. Fishgold, 328 U.S. 275 (1946);
Tilton v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 376 U.S. 169 (1946), or for leases in privately-
owned buildings; suppose even that these priorities were applied directly by govern-
ment agencies, such as the United States Employment Service, a state educational
testing and qualifications board, a housing assignment office, or the like. The hypotheti-
cal regulatory analogue to public management may seem to be government control so
all-pervasive as to be surely unconstitutional; still, constitutional attack would have to
demonstrate invasion of an identifiable claimant's interest protected by some specific
constitutional guarantee. The present argument is that (once the due process claims of
the private owner as such have been segregated) claims under constitutional guarantees
that would prevail against such pervasive regulation would equally prevail against in-
vasions by direct government management in the public sector. Third, it has been
recognized in this article that constitutional adjudication as we know it cannot assure
affirmative first-amendment claims to government support in the public sector; effective
rights both to religious and to secular self-expression require the existence of privately
accessible and allocable resources in a thriving and diffused private economic sector.
See supra, text at notes 252, 253.
[VOL. 40 : 10
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS-JUSTICE DOUGLAS
Mr. Justice Douglas in Barsky v. Board of Regents432 expressed the
nature of constitutional limitations. "And so the question here is not
what government must give, but rather what it may not take away.", 3
In the public sector, refusal to give is the easiest means of taking away.
But a sovereign whose name is blessed when it giveth and blessed when
it taketh away would claim inheritance from the divine right of kings
more than from the Constitution. Government finds itself operating a
public sector for various reasons, some with historical roots as old as
the Constitution-the military, the public lands, the post office-others
the accretion of two centuries of growth in public services. The twenty-
five years of Mr. Justice Douglas's Supreme Court service that are the
occasion for this survey have seen that growth accelerate sharply in
response to new demands in a rapidly changing world. It has passed the
point where the historically exceptional position of early government
operations might furnish doctrine that today would provide the modern
state with a vastly greater exemption from constitutional prohibitions.
And the public sector will continue to grow, absolutely whether or not
relatively, with the growth of the nation. Public financing, manage-
ment, services and benefits, rewards and incentives, will remain more
important instruments than prohibitions and penalties in government's
tool kit for tackling new problems.
Thus, the coming test of constitutional adjudication is whether it
can maintain toward the use of these tools, as toward the traditional
methods of government, the basic values of the Constitution-the sub-
stantive and procedural rights of individuals against government, and
the classic federal antinomy of free personal and economic movement
throughout a nation of politically separate states. Whether a particular
decision is for or against the claimed right, it must be fashioned from
premises that keep the constitutional commands relevant across the
whole range of governmental activities in a mixed economy. In the
modem state, constitutional decisions grounded in a difference between
government operation and government regulation are not likely to
enjoy a long life expectancy. Already, in fact, few substantial decisions
stand in support of such a difference in constitutional limitations. In
the next twenty-five years, the law of constitutional rights in the public
sector may well follow Mr. Justice Douglas's lead toward liberty in the
welfare state.
482 347 U.S. 442 (1954). See 39 WAsH. L. Rxv. 4, 40 (1964).
433 Id. at 473.
